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Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design

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  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Parag A. Pathak
  • Tayfun Sönmez
  • M. Utku Ünver

Abstract

COVID-19 convalescent plasma (CCP) therapy is currently a leading treatment for COVID-19. At present, there is a shortage of CCP relative to demand. We develop and analyze a model of centralized CCP allocation that incorporates both donation and distribution. In order to increase CCP supply, we introduce a mechanism that utilizes two incentive schemes, respectively based on principles of “paying it backward” and “paying it forward.” Under the first scheme, CCP donors obtain treatment vouchers that can be transferred to patients of their choosing. Under the latter scheme, patients obtain priority for CCP therapy in exchange for a future pledge to donate CCP if possible. We show that in steady-state, both principles generally increase overall treatment rates for all patients—not just those who are voucher-prioritized or pledged to donate. Our results also hold under certain conditions if a fraction of CCP is reserved for patients who participate in clinical trials. Finally, we examine the implications of pooling blood types on the efficiency and equity of CCP distribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020. "Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design," NBER Working Papers 27143, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27143
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    Cited by:

    1. Parag Pathak & Govind Persad & Tayfun Sönmez & M Utku Ünver, 2022. "Reserve system design for allocation of scarce medical resources in a pandemic: some perspectives from the field," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 38(4), pages 924-940.
    2. Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan, 2023. "Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 403-427.
    3. van de Klundert, Joris & van der Hagen, Liana & Markus, Aniek, 2022. "Eliminating transplant waiting time inequities – With an application to kidney allocation in the USA," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 297(3), pages 977-985.
    4. Anna Nagurney & Pritha Dutta, 2021. "A Multiclass, Multiproduct Covid-19 Convalescent Plasma Donor Equilibrium Model," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 1-30, September.
    5. Xiang Han & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2021. "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1038, Boston College Department of Economics.
    6. Kim, Jaehong & Li, Mengling & Xu, Menghan, 2021. "Organ donation with vouchers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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