IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxford/v38y2022i4p924-940..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reserve system design for allocation of scarce medical resources in a pandemic: some perspectives from the field
[‘Explicit vs Statistical Targeting in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago’s Exam Schools’]

Author

Listed:
  • Parag Pathak
  • Govind Persad
  • Tayfun Sönmez
  • M Utku Ünver

Abstract

Reserve systems are a tool to allocate scarce resources when stakeholders do not have a single objective. This paper introduces some basic concepts about reserve systems for pandemic medical resource allocation. At the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, we proposed that reserve systems can help practitioners arrive at compromises between competing stakeholders. More than a dozen states and local jurisdictions adopted reserve systems in initial phases of vaccine distribution. We highlight several design issues arising in some of these implementations. We also offer suggestions about ways practitioners can take advantage of the flexibility offered by reserve systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Parag Pathak & Govind Persad & Tayfun Sönmez & M Utku Ünver, 2022. "Reserve system design for allocation of scarce medical resources in a pandemic: some perspectives from the field [‘Explicit vs Statistical Targeting in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from ," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 38(4), pages 924-940.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:38:y:2022:i:4:p:924-940.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oxrep/grac034
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kim, Jaehong & Li, Mengling & Xu, Menghan, 2021. "Organ donation with vouchers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    2. Scott Duke Kominers & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020. "Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1007, Boston College Department of Economics.
    3. Tabarrok, Alexander (ed.), 2002. "The Entrepreneurial Economist: Bright Ideas from the Dismal Science," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195145038.
    4. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020. "Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1015, Boston College Department of Economics.
    5. Dur, Umut & Pathak, Parag A. & Sönmez, Tayfun, 2020. "Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Joshua S Gans, 2022. "Optimal allocation of vaccines in a pandemic [‘An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization’]," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 38(4), pages 912-923.
    2. Scott Duke Kominers & Alex Tabarrok, 2022. "Vaccines and the Covid-19 pandemic: lessons from failure and success [‘Many Say They’re Confused About Whether, When to Get Second Booster’]," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 38(4), pages 719-741.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan, 2023. "Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 403-427.
    2. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 536-548.
    3. Parag A. Pathak & Harald Schmidt & Adam Solomon & Edwin Song & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020. "Do Black and Indigenous Communities Receive their Fair Share of Vaccines Under the 2018 CDC Guidelines?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1019, Boston College Department of Economics.
    4. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2019. "Can Economic Theory be Informative for the Judiciary? Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1026, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 23 Jun 2021.
    5. Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms," NBER Working Papers 26767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Abizada, Azar & Bó, Inácio, 2021. "Hiring from a pool of workers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 576-591.
    7. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020. "Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1015, Boston College Department of Economics.
    8. Battal Doğan & Kemal Yildiz, 2023. "Choice with Affirmative Action," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2284-2296, April.
    9. Nikhil Vellodi & Joshua Weiss, 2021. "Optimal Vaccine Policies: Spillovers and Incentives," Working Paper 21-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    10. Anna Nagurney & Pritha Dutta, 2021. "A Multiclass, Multiproduct Covid-19 Convalescent Plasma Donor Equilibrium Model," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 1-30, September.
    11. Hafalir, Isa E. & Kojima, Fuhito & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2022. "Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    12. Doğan, Battal & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 366-373.
    13. Élisabeth Tovar & Matthieu Bunel, 2021. "Attitudes on past-in-present educational discrimination. Insights from a representative factorial survey," EconomiX Working Papers 2021-28, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    14. Babus, Ana & Das, Sanmay & Lee, SangMok, 2020. "The Optimal Allocation of Covid-19 Vaccines," CEPR Discussion Papers 15329, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Philip J Held & Frank McCormick & Glenn M Chertow & Thomas G Peters & John P Roberts, 2018. "Would government compensation of living kidney donors exploit the poor? An empirical analysis," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(11), pages 1-14, November.
    16. Haris Aziz & Florian Brandl, 2021. "Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing," Papers 2102.04384, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
    17. Parag A. Pathak & Alex Rees-Jones & Tayfun Sönmez, 2023. "Reversing Reserves," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(11), pages 6940-6953, November.
    18. Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2020. "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process Through Market Design," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1035, Boston College Department of Economics.
    19. Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2021. "Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process," Papers 2106.06582, arXiv.org.
    20. Babus, Ana & Das, Sanmay & Lee, SangMok, 2023. "The optimal allocation of Covid-19 vaccines," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    reserve system; categorized priority system; Covid-19; vaccine allocation; equitable allocation; ethical rationing; market design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:38:y:2022:i:4:p:924-940.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oxrep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.