Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach
We develop a network-flow approach for characterizing interim-allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations. Our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi-unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints, both ceilings and floors. Applications include a variety of settings of practical interest, ranging from individual and group-specific capacity constraints, set-aside sale, partnership dissolution, and government license reallocation.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2011|
|Date of revision:||Mar 2013|
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