Managing Strategic Buyers
We consider the problem of a monopolist who must sell her inventory before some deadline, facing buyers with independent private values. The seller faces a basic trade-off between imperfect price discrimination and maintaining an effective reserve price. When there is only one unit and only a few buyers, the seller essentially posts unacceptable prices up to the very end, at which point prices collapse in a series of jumps to a "reserve price" exceeding marginal cost. When there are many buyers, the seller abandons this reserve price in order to more effectively screen buyers, with prices decreasing continuously over time.
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- Kinshuk Jerath & Serguei Netessine & Senthil K. Veeraraghavan, 2010. "Revenue Management with Strategic Customers: Last-Minute Selling and Opaque Selling," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(3), pages 430-448, March.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, March.
- Guillermo Gallego & Garrett van Ryzin, 1994. "Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(8), pages 999-1020, August.
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