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Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly

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  • Seres, Gyula

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

This paper considers dynamic pricing strategies in a durable good monopoly model with uncertain commitment power to set price paths. The type of the monopolist is private information of the firm and not observable to consumers. If commitment to future prices is not possible, the initial price is high in equilibrium, but the firm falls prey to the Coase conjecture later to capture the residual demand. The relative price cut is increasing in the probability of commitment as buyers anticipate that a steady price is likely and purchase early. Pooling in prices may occur for perpetuity if commitment is suciently weak. Polling for innity is also preserved if committing to a high price is endogenously chosen by the firm.
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Suggested Citation

  • Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly," Discussion Paper 201-012, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:bece5078-67ec-458b-807c-3c18fc79e2fa
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    monopoly; commitment; Information asymmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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