Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment
We propose an equilibrium model of duopolistic dynamic pricing in which a buyer alternates between two sellers for price offers over a finite time horizon. The game ends when the buyer accepts a price offer or the selling season is over, whichever comes first. Previous research (Granot et al., 2007) shows that there are successive markdowns in equilibrium when the buyer is commonly known to be myopic; our analysis suggests that when she is known to be strategic price offers over the entire selling season are constant. Moreover, lengthening the season increases (generally decreases) both sellersʼ profits when the buyer is myopic (strategic). An experimental study largely supports the equilibrium predictions when the buyer is myopic but not when she is strategic. In the latter case, early in the season sellers overprice the good arguably in an attempt to effectively shorten the season and thereby increase their profits.
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