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Ticket Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

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  • Courty, Pascal

Abstract

This paper studies the case of a monopolist who sells tickets to consumers who learn new information about their demands over time. The monopolist can sell early to uninformed consumers and/or close to the event date to informed ones, or it can ration tickets and allow ticket holders to resell. I show that rationing and intertemporal sales are never optimal. More surprising, the monopolist cannot do strictly better by allowing resale. I discuss the implications of the model for the pricing practices observed in ticket markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Courty, Pascal, 2003. "Ticket Pricing under Demand Uncertainty," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 627-652, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2003:v:46:i:2:p:627-52
    DOI: 10.1086/377117
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Clay, Karen B & Sibley, David S & Srinagesh, Padmanabhan, 1992. "Ex Post vs. Ex Ante Pricing: Optional Calling Plans and Tapered Tariffs," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 115-138, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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