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How to Price Discriminate When Tariff Size Matters

Author

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  • Adib Bagh

    (Department of Economics, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky 40506)

  • Hemant K. Bhargava

    (Graduate School of Management, University of California, Davis, Davis, California 95616)

Abstract

Firms that serve a large market with many diverse consumer types use discriminatory or nonlinear pricing to extract higher revenue, inducing consumers to separate by self-selecting from a large number of tariff options. But the extent of price discrimination must often be tempered by the high costs of devising and managing discriminatory tariffs, including costs of supporting consumers in understanding and making selection from a complex menu of choices. These tariff design trade-offs occur in many industries where firms face many consumer types and each consumer picks the number of units to consume over time. Examples include wireless communication services, other telecom and information technology products, legal plans, fitness clubs, automobile clubs, parking, healthcare plans, and many services and utilities. This paper evaluates alternative ways to price discriminate while accounting for both revenues and tariff management costs. The revenue-maximizing menu of quantity-price bundles can be very (or infinitely) large and hence not practical. Instead, two-part tariffs (2PTs), which charge a fixed entry fee and a per-unit fee, can extract a large fraction of the optimal revenue with a small menu of choices, and they become more attractive once the costs of tariff management are factored in. We show that three-part tariffs (3PTs), which use an additional instrument, the "free allowance," are an even more efficient way to price discriminate. A relatively small menu of 3PTs can be more profitable than a menu of 2PTs of any size. This 3PT menu can be designed with less information about consumer preferences relative to the menu of two-part tariffs, which, in order to segment customers optimally, needs fine-grained information about preferences. Our analysis reveals a counterintuitive insight that more-complex tariffs need not always be more profitable; it matters whether the complexity is from many choices or more pricing instruments.

Suggested Citation

  • Adib Bagh & Hemant K. Bhargava, 2013. "How to Price Discriminate When Tariff Size Matters," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(1), pages 111-126, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:32:y:2013:i:1:p:111-126
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1120.0720
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