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Uncertain Demand, Consumer Loss Aversion, And Flat-Rate Tariffs

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  • Fabian Herweg
  • Konrad Mierendorff

Abstract

We consider a model of firm pricing and consumer choice, where consumers are loss averse and uncertain about their future demand. Possibly, consumers in our model prefer a flat rate to a measured tariff, even though this choice does not minimize their expected billing amount-a behavior in line with ample empirical evidence. We solve for the profit-maximizing two-part tariff, which is a flat rate if (a) marginal costs are not too high, (b) loss aversion is intense, and (c) there are strong variations in demand. Moreover, we analyze the optimal nonlinear tariff. This tariff has a large flat part when a flat rate is optimal among the class of two-part tariffs.
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Suggested Citation

  • Fabian Herweg & Konrad Mierendorff, 2013. "Uncertain Demand, Consumer Loss Aversion, And Flat-Rate Tariffs," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 399-432, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jeurec:v:11:y:2013:i:2:p:399-432
    DOI: jeea.12004
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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