Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
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- Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2006. "Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(3), pages 689-714.
- Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2004. "Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000530, UCLA Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Contracts; Dynamic inconsistency; Naivety; Non-common priors;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2005-02-13 (Microeconomics)
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