Why is There No AIDS Vaccine?
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Cited by:
- Diana Sonntag, 2014. "FUNDING HIV‐VACCINE RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES—WHAT IS WRONG WITH IAVI's RECOMMENDATION?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 141-158, February.
- Leoni, Patrick & Luchini, Stéphane, 2011.
"Designing the financial tools to promote universal access to AIDS care,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 181-188, January.
- Patarick Leoni & Stephane Luchini, 2006. "Designing the Financial Tools to Promote Universal Access to AIDS Care," Economics Department Working Paper Series n1711106, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
- Alexander Saak, 2007. "A note on the value of public information in monopoly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(2), pages 369-379, November.
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