Quality, upgrades and equilibrium in a dynamic monopoly market
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Xiong, Yu & Zhao, Pei & Xiong, Zhongkai & Li, Gendao, 2016. "The impact of product upgrading on the decision of entrance to a secondary market," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 252(2), pages 443-454.
More about this item
KeywordsUpgrades; Durable goods; Monopoly; Market power; Coordination; Bundling;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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