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Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment

  • Kambe, Shinsuke
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45GMF0D-S/2/8db94e5029c34e61838ff83026c0d925
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 28 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 217-237

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:217-237
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine.
    2. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1993. "Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game," Munich Reprints in Economics 19778, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine.
    4. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
    5. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June.
    6. Abhinay Muthoo, . "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Economics Discussion Papers 420, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    7. J. Watson, 2010. "A ‘Reputation’ Refinement without Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 580, David K. Levine.
    8. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
    9. David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
    10. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-37, May.
    11. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
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