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Reputation and Repeated Bargaining with a Third Party

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  • Jihong Lee

    (Birkbeck College University of London)

  • Qingmin Liu

    (University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

of reputation building converges to a level strictly between 0 and 1. However, the two limiting cases differ in the number of third party signals invoked.

Suggested Citation

  • Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2009. "Reputation and Repeated Bargaining with a Third Party," 2009 Meeting Papers 151, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:151
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roland Benabou & Guy Laroque, 1992. "Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 921-958.
    2. Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2007. "Dynamic signaling and market breakdown," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 58-82, March.
    3. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927, April.
    4. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019, April.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1098, David K. Levine.
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