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Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics

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  • Guillermo Ordonez

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  • Guillermo Ordonez, 2008. "Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002250, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002250
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    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/dissertation_guillermo.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why do Politicians Delegate?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2079, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    2. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," Penn CARESS Working Papers bb1b279d6539c9ed3b83a027c, Penn Economics Department.
    3. repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0007 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, March.
    5. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2001. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 415-441.
    6. Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2007. "Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 287-316, May.
    7. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1996. "Reputation spillover across relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 209, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    8. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    10. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    11. Segendorff, Björn, 2000. "A Signalling Theory of Scapegoats," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 406, Stockholm School of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ordoñez, Guillermo L., 2013. "Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.

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