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Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships

Author

Listed:
  • Cripps,M.W.
  • Mailath,G.J.
  • Samuelson,L.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

Abstract

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player’s reputation is private.
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Suggested Citation

  • Cripps,M.W. & Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L., 2004. "Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  • Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:20045
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    File URL: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/%7Elarrysam/papers/reppriv.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cole, Harold L & Dow, James & English, William B, 1995. "Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 365-385, May.
    2. repec:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0007 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, March.
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1995. "Subjective games and equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 123-163.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 13, pages 275-307 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 8, pages 143-161 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2001. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 415-441.
    8. Sergiu Hart, 1985. "Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 117-153, February.
    9. Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "Maintaining A Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 9, pages 163-176 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    10. repec:cor:louvrp:-636 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Games and Equilibria," Working Papers 875, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    12. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    13. Christopher Phelan, 2001. "Public trust and government betrayal," Staff Report 283, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    14. Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
    15. Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2006. "Private monitoring with infinite histories," Staff Report 383, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    2. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
    3. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    4. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.
    5. repec:eee:beexfi:v:7:y:2015:i:c:p:33-41 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    7. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
    8. Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2012. "Reputation with Analogical Reasoning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1927-1969.
    9. repec:eee:eecrev:v:98:y:2017:i:c:p:424-441 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Markus Kinateder, 2013. "Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 283-294, February.
    11. Guillermo Ordonez, 2008. "Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002250, David K. Levine.
    12. Gomaa, Mohamed & Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Mestelman, Stuart & Shehata, Mohamed, 2015. "Exercising empowerment in an investment environment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(C), pages 33-41.
    13. Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2008. "Common Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(4), pages 909-933, July.
    14. Miriam Schütte & Philipp Christoph Wichardt, 2013. "Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4193, CESifo Group Munich.
    15. Guillermo Ordonez, 2005. "Don't Ask Why Things Went Wrong: Nested Reputation and Scapegoating Inefficiency," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000988, David K. Levine.
    16. Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Mestelman, Stuart & Nainar, S.M. Khalid & Shehata, Mohamed, 2010. "Trust and reciprocity with transparency and repeated interactions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 241-247, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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