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Reputations in Repeated Games

Author

Listed:
  • George J. Mailath

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Larry Samuelson

    (Department of Economics, Yale University)

Abstract

This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.

Suggested Citation

  • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Reputations in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-034, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:13-034
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    File URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/13-034.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jesper Rudiger & Adrien Vigier, 2015. "Pundits and Quacks," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1997, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Boudreau, Laura & Heath, Rachel & McCormick, Tyler H., 2024. "Migrants, experience, and working conditions in Bangladeshi garment factories," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 196-213.
    3. Baojun Jiang & Bicheng Yang, 2019. "Quality and Pricing Decisions in a Market with Consumer Information Sharing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 272-285, January.
    4. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    5. Andreozzi, Luciano & Tamborini, Roberto, 2019. "Models of supranational policymaking and the reform of the EMU," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 819-844.
    6. Ji Huang & Zongbo Huang & Xiang Shao, 2023. "The Risk of Implicit Guarantees: Evidence from Shadow Banks in China," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1521-1544.
    7. Aner Sela & Ishay Rabi & Chen Cohen, 2024. "Reputation in Contests," Working Papers 2409, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    8. Stefano Castriota & Paolo Frumento & Francesco Suppressa, 2024. "Identifying the collective reputation premium: a spatial discontinuity approach," Discussion Papers 2024/310, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    9. Zago, Angelo, 2015. "La réputation collective sur les marchés agricoles," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 345(January-F).
    10. Erfan Rezvani & Christian Rojas, 2022. "Firm responsiveness to consumers' reviews: The effect on online reputation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 898-922, November.
    11. Samuelson, Larry & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2017. "Even up: Maintaining relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 170-217.
    12. Fei Li & Jidong Zhou, 2020. "A Model of Crisis Management," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2266R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2022.
    13. Shuyao Ke & Liangjun Su & Peter C. B. Phillips, 2022. "Unified Factor Model Estimation and Inference under Short and Long Memory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2351, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    14. Harry Pei, 2022. "Reputation Effects under Short Memories," Papers 2207.02744, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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