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Reputations in Repeated Games

Listed author(s):
  • George J. Mailath

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Larry Samuelson

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Yale University)

This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.

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File URL: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/13-034.pdf
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Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 13-034.

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Length: 84 pages
Date of creation: 27 Jun 2013
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:13-034
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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
  2. Stephen Morris, 1999. "Political Correctness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1242, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Olivier Gossner, 2011. "Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(5), pages 1627-1641, 09.
  4. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Benabou, R. & Laroque, G., 1988. "Using Privileged Information To Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus And Credibility," Papers 19, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  7. David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Paul R. Milgrom, 1988. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 875, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Martin Cripps & George J Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000060, David K. Levine.
  9. Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L., 1998. "Who wants a good reputation?," Working papers 19, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  10. Cripps,M.W. & Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L., 2004. "Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  11. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," Post-Print hal-00813044, HAL.
  12. Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2012. "Reputation with Analogical Reasoning," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00813043, HAL.
  13. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  14. Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  15. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2012. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 451-480.
  17. Aoyagi, Masaki, 1996. "Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 444-469, August.
  18. Phelan, Christopher, 2006. "Public trust and government betrayal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 27-43, September.
  19. Marco Celentani, 1993. "Maintaining a Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," Discussion Papers 1075R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Cripps, Martin W. & Dekel, Eddie & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2005. "Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 259-272, April.
  21. David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
  22. Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2007. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1794-1823, December.
  23. D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
  24. Jeffrey Ely, 2000. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0210, Econometric Society.
  25. Cripps,Martin & Scmidt,Klaus & Thomas,Jonathan, 1993. "Reputation in pertubed repeated games," Discussion Paper Serie A 410, University of Bonn, Germany.
  26. Conlon, John R., 2003. "Hope springs eternal: learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 35-65, September.
  27. Piccione, Michele, 2002. "The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 70-83, January.
  28. Schmidt, K.M., 1992. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests," Working papers 92-7, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  29. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," Discussion Papers 1348, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  30. Qingmin Liu, 2011. "Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 1400-1425.
  31. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5434 is not listed on IDEAS
  32. Al-Najjar, Nabil Ibraheem, 1995. "Decomposition and Characterization of Risk with a Continuum of Random Variables," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1195-1224, September.
  33. Cole, Harold L & Dow, James & English, William B, 1995. "Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 365-385, May.
  34. Eduardo Faingold & Yuliy Sannikov, 2011. "Reputation in Continuous‐Time Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 773-876, 05.
  35. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2013. "A two-sided reputation result with long-run players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 376-392.
  36. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
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