Common Learning
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- Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Common Learning," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000355, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Common Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1575, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Common Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1575R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2007.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2007. "Common Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Martin W. Cripps & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-031, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2004.
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2015.
"A model of belief influence in large social networks,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 21-59, May.
- Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2014. "A model of belief influence in large social networks," Working papers DTE 572, CIDE, División de Economía.
- Martin Cripps & Jeffrey Ely & George Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2013.
"Common learning with intertemporal dependence,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 55-98, February.
- Martin W. Cripps & Jeffrey C. Ely & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-012, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011.
"Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 100-120, January.
- Drew Fudenberg & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001695, David K. Levine.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Fudenberg, Drew, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Scholarly Articles 27755310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Amil Dasgupta & Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007.
"Efficient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning,"
Working Papers
tecipa-301, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Dasgupta, Amil & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2007. "Efficient dynamic coordination with individual learning," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24498, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Amil Dasgupta & Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007. "Efficient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 175, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Amil Dasgupta & Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2007. "Efficient Dynamic Coordination with Individual Learning," FMG Discussion Papers dp600, Financial Markets Group.
- Chong Huang, 2011. "Coordination and Social Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Arieli, Itai & Levy, Yehuda John, 2015.
"Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 166-185.
- Itai Arieliy & Yehuda (John) Levy, 2014. "Determinacy of Games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Paper Series dp658, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Morris, Stephen, 2014.
"Coordination, timing and common knowledge,"
Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 306-314.
- Stephen Morris, 2013. "Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge," Working Papers 061-2014, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2008.
"Communication Can Destroy Common Learning,"
Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
184, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2008. "Communication Can Destroy Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-330, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2011.
"Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks,"
Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 3-49, March.
- Daron Acemoglu & Asuman E. Ozdaglar, 2010. "Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000222, David K. Levine.
- Eeckhout, Jan & Weng, Xi, 2015. "Common value experimentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 317-339.
- Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
- repec:cca:wpaper:48 is not listed on IDEAS
- Chong Huang, 2018. "Coordination and social learning," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(1), pages 155-177, January.
- Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2011.
"Communication, timing, and common learning,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 230-247, January.
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Discussion Papers 1484, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Communication, Timing, and Common Learning," Working Papers tecipa-389, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Wiseman, Thomas, 2009. "Reputation and exogenous private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1352-1357, May.
- Dasgupta, Amil & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2012. "Dynamic coordination with individual learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 83-101.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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