Common learning with intertemporal dependence
Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents commonly learn the value of the parameter, i.e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically distributed across time (but not necessarily across agents), the answer is yes (Cripps et al., Econometrica, 76(4):909–933, 2008 ). This paper explores the implications of allowing the signals to be dependent over time. We present a counterexample showing that even extremely simple time dependence can preclude common learning, and present sufficient conditions for common learning. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
Volume (Year): 42 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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