Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited
Suppose we replace "knowledge" by "belief with probability p" in standard definitions of common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of common knowledge used in the substitution. This paper demonstrates those differences and identifies which notion is relevant in each of three contexts: equilibrium analysis in incomplete information games, best response dynamics in incomplete information games, and agreeing to disagree/no trade results.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:penntw:6be11f49fbded40b2a623aebfa5361c6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.