Cooperation under Incomplete Information on the Discount Factors
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- Cy Maor & Eilon Solan, 2015. "Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 321-346, May.
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- Zeng, Weijun & Ai, Hongfeng & Zhao, Man, 2019. "Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 359(C), pages 148-164.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-11-12 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2014-11-12 (Game Theory)
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