Uniform continuity of the value of zero-sum games with differential information
We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semicontinuous when the information fields of players change, even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin & Haimanko, Ori & Einy, Ezra, 2003.
"On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
we032707, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2005. "On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 793-812, November.
- Van Zandt, Timothy, 2002. "Information, measurability, and continuous behavior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 293-309, November.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997.
"Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games,"
1193R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Cotter, Kevin D., 1986. "Similarity of information and behavior with a pointwise convergence topology," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 25-38, February.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 1990. "Bayesian information topologies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 233-253.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we041603. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ana Poveda)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.