Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information
We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semi-continuous when the information fields of players change (even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets), and is approximately lower semi-continuous.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2007|
|Note:||Revised version of Discussion Paper # 04-04 of Monaster Center for Economic Research, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: +81-42-580-8000|
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INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 619-632, November.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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