Minorities and Storable Votes
The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. The storable votes mechanism grants each voter a stock of votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions. By accumulating votes on issues that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preference is high and the majority's strength of preference is low. The result is that with storable votes, aggregate efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions of our model are confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory.
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|Date of creation:||Sep 2005|
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- Casella, Alessandra, 2002.
CEPR Discussion Papers
3508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2007.
Economics Series Working Papers
320, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2003.
"An Experimental Study of Storable Votes,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4081, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alessandra Casella & Andrew Gelman & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003. "An Experimental Study of Storable Votes," NBER Working Papers 9982, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003. "An Experimental Study of Storable Votes," Working Papers 1173, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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