Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with a continuum of privately observedagent types that are persistent over time. For a sufficiently productive relationship,a pooling contract exists in which all agent types continuing the relationshipchoose the same action. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for some separationto be feasible; the parties can then do better than with full pooling. When futureactions are optimal, however, separation of all types is not possible; the finest separationachievable is into partitions each containing a non-degenerate interval of types.Separation always involves lower output initially than after separation has occurred.
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