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A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining

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  • David A. Miller
  • Joel Watson

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  • David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:81:y:2013:i:6:p:2303-2350
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Fahn, 2017. "Minimum Wages and Relational Contracts," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 301-331.
    2. Miller, David & Olsen, Trond E. & Watson, Joel, 2018. "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," Discussion Papers 2018/8, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    3. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
    4. Joel Watson, 2013. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 1-40, August.
    5. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2013. "Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2013/13, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    6. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.
    7. Cordero Salas, Paula, 2016. "Relational Contracts and Product Quality: The Effect of Bargaining Power on Efficiency and Distribution," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 1-19.
    8. Matthias Fahn & Valeria Merlo & Georg Wamser, 2014. "The Commitment Role of Equity Financing," CESifo Working Paper Series 4841, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2016. "Teams in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016/23, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    10. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Evagelos Pafilis, 2018. "Common Ownership of Public Goods," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 18/700, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    11. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2016. "Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 741-767, October.
    12. Mikhail Safronov & Bruno Strulovici, 2014. "Explicit Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 1575, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Marina Halac, 2012. "Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 750-779, April.
    14. Marina Halac, 2015. "Investing in a relationship," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(1), pages 165-185, March.
    15. repec:spr:joecth:v:66:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1060-1 is not listed on IDEAS

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