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David A. Miller

Personal Details

First Name:David
Middle Name:A.
Last Name:Miller
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pmi140
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~econdm

Affiliation

Economics Department
University of Michigan

Ann Arbor, Michigan (United States)
http://www.econ.lsa.umich.edu/

: (734) 764-2355
(734) 764-2769
611 S. Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
RePEc:edi:edumius (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000270, David K. Levine.
  2. Timothy Keller & David Miller & Xiahua (Anny) Wei, 2010. "A Steady State Approach to a Network Externality Market With Switching Costs," Working Papers 10-19, NET Institute.
  3. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2009. "Need I remind you? Monitoring with collective memory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000236, David K. Levine.
  4. David Miller & Nageeb Ali, 2008. "Cooperation and Collective Enforcement in Networked Societies," 2008 Meeting Papers 970, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Susan Athey & David Miller, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. David A. Miller, 2005. "The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information," Game Theory and Information 0510002, EconWPA.
  7. David A. Miller, 2005. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," Industrial Organization 0510001, EconWPA.

    repec:hhs:nhhfms:2018_008 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. S. Nageeb Ali & David A. Miller, 2016. "Ostracism and Forgiveness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 2329-2348, August.
  2. David A. Miller Jr. & Kareen Rozen Jr., 2014. "Wasteful Sanctions, Underperformance, and Endogenous Supervision," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 326-361, November.
  3. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
  4. David A. Miller, 2012. "Robust Collusion with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 778-811.
  5. Miller, David A., 2008. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 387-412, April.
  6. Athey, Susan & Miller, David A., 2007. "Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
  7. Goldfarb, Brent & Kirsch, David & Miller, David A., 2007. "Was there too little entry during the Dot Com Era?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 100-144, October.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1823, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2012.

    Mentioned in:

    1. Contracts with empty promises
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-10-27 19:04:00

RePEc Biblio mentions

As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography of Economics:
  1. Miller, David A., 2008. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 387-412, April.

    Mentioned in:

    1. > Economic Development Technological Change, and Growth > Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

Working papers

  1. David Miller & Nageeb Ali, 2008. "Cooperation and Collective Enforcement in Networked Societies," 2008 Meeting Papers 970, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas CARAYOL & Lorenzo CASSI & Pascale ROUX, 2014. "Unintended triadic closure in social networks: The strategic formation of research collaborations between French inventors," Cahiers du GREThA 2014-13, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
    2. Emla Fitzsimons & Bansi Malde & Marcos Vera-Hernandez, 2016. "Spillovers of community based health interventions on consumption smoothing," IFS Working Papers W16/18, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    3. Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2012. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 54250, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Attila Ambrus & Markus Mobius & Adam Szeidl, 2007. "Consumption Risk-sharing in Social Networks," Economics Working Papers 0079, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    5. Feinberg, Yossi & Kets, Willemien, 2012. "Ranking Friends," Research Papers 2127, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    6. Konstantin Büchel und Maximilian von Ehrlich, 2016. "Cities and the Structure of Social Interactions: Evidence from Mobile Phone Data," Diskussionsschriften dp1608, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    7. Francesco Nava & Michele Piccione, 2011. "Efficiency in Repeated Two-Action Games with Local Monitoring," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 560, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    8. Matthew O. Jackson & Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer & Xu Tan, 2012. "Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1857-1897, August.
    9. Felipe Balmaceda & Juan Escobar, 2013. "Trust in Cohesive Communities," Working Papers 40, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    10. Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2011. "Efficiency in repeated two-action games with local monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58062, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2012. "Games on Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 9127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Matthew O. Jackson & Brian W. Rogers & Yves Zenou, 2017. "The Economic Consequences of Social-Network Structure," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 49-95, March.
    13. Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2014. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    14. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2015. "Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 21457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Matthew Elliott & Arun Chandrasekhar & Attila Ambrus, 2015. "Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality," 2015 Meeting Papers 189, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Attila Ambrus & Arun G. Chandrasekhar & Matt Elliott, 2014. "Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 20669, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. James Andreoni & Michael A. Kuhn & Larry Samuelson, 2016. "Starting Small: Endogenous Stakes and Rational Cooperation," NBER Working Papers 21934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Isaiah Andrews & Daniel Barron, 2016. "The Allocation of Future Business: Dynamic Relational Contracts with Multiple Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2742-2759, September.

  2. Susan Athey & David Miller, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Drexl, Moritz & Kleiner, Andreas, 2013. "Preference Intensities in Repeated Collective Decision-Making," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79832, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Drexl, Moritz & Kleiner, Andreas, 2015. "Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 169-181.
    3. Liu, Heng, 0. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    4. Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2013. "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2463-2485, November.
    5. Alberto Martin & Wouter Vergote, 2005. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," Economics Working Papers 914, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2008.
    6. Andrzej Skrzypacz & Juuso Toikka, 2015. "Mechanisms for Repeated Trade," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 252-293, November.
    7. Rohit Lamba & Ilia Krasikov, 2017. "A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints," 2017 Meeting Papers 1544, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Eilat, Ran & Pauzner, Ady, 2011. "Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 503-512, March.
    9. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2015. "Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 188-211.
    10. Leo, Greg, 2017. "Taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 525-547.

  3. David A. Miller, 2005. "The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information," Game Theory and Information 0510002, EconWPA.

    Cited by:

    1. Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production," 2004 Meeting Papers 418, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Drexl, Moritz & Kleiner, Andreas, 2015. "Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 169-181.
    3. Heidhues, Paul & Blume, Andreas & Franco, April, 2013. "Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80027, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Joao Correia-da-Silva, 2013. "Impossibility of market division with two-sided private information about production costs," FEP Working Papers 490, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    5. Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2013. "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2463-2485, November.
    6. Alberto Martin & Wouter Vergote, 2005. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," Economics Working Papers 914, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2008.
    7. Kleiner, Andreas & Drexl, Moritz, 2013. "Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79886, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Andrzej Skrzypacz & Juuso Toikka, 2015. "Mechanisms for Repeated Trade," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 252-293, November.
    9. Vinicius Carrasco & Gustavo Manso, 2006. "Syndication and Robust Collusion in Financial Markets," Textos para discussão 522, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    10. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin, 2016. "Optimal allocation of an indivisible good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 95-112.
    12. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    13. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2015. "Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 188-211.
    14. Leo, Greg, 2017. "Taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 525-547.
    15. Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2004. "Antidumping: Welfare Enhancing Retaliation?," MPRA Paper 5416, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  4. David A. Miller, 2005. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," Industrial Organization 0510001, EconWPA.

    Cited by:

    1. Luis Cabral & Ben Polak, 2012. "Standing on the Shoulders of Babies: Dominant Firms and Incentives to Innovate," Working Papers 12-18, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    2. Wen Wen & Feng Zhu, 2016. "How Do Complementors Respond to the Threat of Platform Owner Entry? Evidence from the Mobile App Market," Working Papers 16-10, NET Institute.
    3. Niedermayer, Andras, 2013. "On platforms, incomplete contracts, and open source software," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 714-722.
    4. Peng Huang & Marco Ceccagnoli & Chris Forman & D. J. Wu, 2013. "Appropriability Mechanisms and the Platform Partnership Decision: Evidence from Enterprise Software," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(1), pages 102-121, July.

Articles

  1. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Fahn, 2016. "Minimum Wages and Relational Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 5986, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Joel Watson, 2013. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 1-40, August.
    4. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2013. "Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2013/13, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    5. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1847, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Cordero Salas, Paula, 2016. "Relational Contracts and Product Quality: The Effect of Bargaining Power on Efficiency and Distribution," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 41(3), September.
    7. Fahn, Matthias & Wamser, Georg & Merlo, Valeria, 2017. "The Commitment Role of Equity Financing," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 41, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    8. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2016. "Teams in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 2016/23, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    9. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2016. "Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 741-767, October.
    10. Mikhail Safronov & Bruno Strulovici, 2014. "Explicit Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 1575, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Marina Halac, 2012. "Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 750-779, April.
    12. Marina Halac, 2015. "Investing in a relationship," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(1), pages 165-185, March.

  2. Goldfarb, Brent & Kirsch, David & Miller, David A., 2007. "Was there too little entry during the Dot Com Era?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 100-144, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Y. Sekou Bermiss & Benjamin L. Hallen & Rory McDonald & Emily C. Pahnke, 2017. "Entrepreneurial beacons: The Yale endowment, run-ups, and the growth of venture capital," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 545-565, March.
    2. Ahmad Ismail, 2010. "Are good financial advisors really good? The performance of investment banks in the M&A market," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 411-429, November.
    3. Ashish Arora & Anand Nandkumar, 2011. "Cash-Out or Flameout! Opportunity Cost and Entrepreneurial Strategy: Theory, and Evidence from the Information Security Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(10), pages 1844-1860, October.
    4. Ang, James S. & Ismail, Ahmad K., 2015. "What premiums do target shareholders expect? Explaining negative returns upon offer announcements," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 245-256.
    5. Huang, Kenneth G. & Murray, Fiona E., 2010. "Entrepreneurial experiments in science policy: Analyzing the Human Genome Project," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 567-582, June.
    6. Sorensen, Morten, 2007. "Learning by Investing: Evidence from Venture Capital," SIFR Research Report Series 53, Institute for Financial Research.
    7. Boyan Jovanovic & Balàzs Szentes, 2007. "On the Return to Venture Capital," NBER Working Papers 12874, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2008. "Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets," MPRA Paper 9142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Mitsuyama, Nahoko & Mitomo, Hitoshi, 2012. "Diverse paths in improving broadband availability: Deductive inference from the perspective of neo-institutional economics," 19th ITS Biennial Conference, Bangkok 2012: Moving Forward with Future Technologies - Opening a Platform for All 72546, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    10. M. Fern'andez-Mart'inez & M. A S'anchez-Granero & Mar'ia Jos'e Mu~noz Torrecillas & Bill McKelvey, 2016. "A comparison among some Hurst exponent approaches to predict nascent bubbles in $500$ company stocks," Papers 1601.04188, arXiv.org.
    11. Cumming, Douglas & Dai, Na, 2011. "Fund size, limited attention and valuation of venture capital backed firms," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 2-15, January.
    12. Feldman , Maryann P. & Tavassoli , Sam, 2015. "Something New: Where do new industries come from?," Papers in Innovation Studies 2015/49, Lund University, CIRCLE - Center for Innovation, Research and Competences in the Learning Economy.
    13. Baldi, Lucia & Peri, Massimo & Vandone, Daniela, 2016. "Stock markets’ bubbles burst and volatility spillovers in agricultural commodity markets," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 277-285.
    14. Peng, Fei & Kang, Lili, 2013. "Cyclical changes in the wage structure of the United Kingdom: a historical review of the GHS 1972-2002," MPRA Paper 47210, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Shikhar Ghosh & Ramana Nanda, 2010. "Venture Capital Investment in the Clean Energy Sector," Harvard Business School Working Papers 11-020, Harvard Business School.
    16. Tinn, K & Vourvachaki, E, 2012. "Can overpricing of technology stocks be good for welfare? Positive spillovers vs. equity market losses," Working Papers 12192, Imperial College, London, Imperial College Business School.
    17. Shane Greenstein, 2006. "Innovation and the Evolution of Market Structure for Internet Access in the United States," Discussion Papers 05-018, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  2. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  3. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2005-10-08 2010-10-09
  2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (2) 2009-06-17 2011-10-15
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2005-10-08 2011-10-15
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2005-10-08 2011-10-15
  5. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2005-08-03
  6. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2010-10-09
  7. NEP-INO: Innovation (1) 2005-10-08
  8. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2010-10-09
  9. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (1) 2009-06-17
  10. NEP-TID: Technology & Industrial Dynamics (1) 2005-10-08

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