Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings

Work on relational employment agreements often predicts low payments or termination for poor performance. The possibility of saving can, however, limit the e˙ectiveness of mone-tary incentives in motivating an employee with diminishing marginal utility for consump-tion. We study the role of savings and their observability in optimal relational contracts. We focus on the case where players are not too patient, and hence the constant first-best e˙ort cannot be implemented. If savings are hidden, the relationship eventually deterio-rates over time. In particular, both payments and e˙ort decline. On the other hand, if savings are public, consumption is initially high, so the agent’s savings fall over time, and e˙ort and payments to the agent increase. The findings thus suggest how tacit agreements on consumption can forestall the deterioration of dynamic relationships in which the agent can save.