IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pga626.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Daniel F. Garrett

Personal Details

First Name:Daniel
Middle Name:F.
Last Name:Garrett
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pga626
http://www.dfgarrett.com
Terminal Degree:2012 Department of Economics; Northwestern University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Toulouse, France
http://www.tse-fr.eu/

: (+33) 5 61 12 86 23


RePEc:edi:tsetofr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Garrett, Daniel F., 2019. "Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective," TSE Working Papers 19-1037, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel Garrett, 2019. "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_132, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  3. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," TSE Working Papers 17-830, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  4. Ely, Jeffrey & Garrett, Daniel F. & Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2016. "Overbooking," TSE Working Papers 16-678, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  5. Garrett, Daniel F., 2016. "Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values," TSE Working Papers 16-679, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  6. Dilmé, Francesc & Garrett, Daniel, 2015. "Residual Deterrence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10994, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Garrett, Daniel & Gomes, Renato & Maestri, Lucas, 2014. "Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 10036, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes," Discussion Papers 1579, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2009. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 127, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  11. John Bryant & Veronica Jacobsen & Matthew Bell & Daniel Garrett, 2004. "Labour Force Participation and GDP in New Zealand," Treasury Working Paper Series 04/07, New Zealand Treasury.

Articles

  1. Daniel F Garrett & Renato Gomes & Lucas Maestri, 2019. "Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 1590-1630.
  2. Daniel F. Garrett, 2019. "Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 375-382, September.
  3. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F Garrett, 2019. "Residual Deterrence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1654-1686.
  4. Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017. "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1258-1301.
  5. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
  6. Daniel F. Garrett, 2016. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3275-3299, November.
  7. Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 775-818.
  8. Garrett, Daniel F., 2014. "Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 631-641.
  9. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
  10. Fong, Yuk-fai & Garrett, Daniel F., 2010. "Bidding in a possibly common-value auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 494-501, November.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," TSE Working Papers 17-830, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Salant, David J. & Cabral, Luís, 2019. "Sequential auctions and auction revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 1-4.
    2. Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017. "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1258-1301.
    3. René Caldentey & Ying Liu & Ilan Lobel, 2017. "Intertemporal Pricing Under Minimax Regret," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 104-129, February.

  2. Ely, Jeffrey & Garrett, Daniel F. & Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2016. "Overbooking," TSE Working Papers 16-678, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  3. Garrett, Daniel F., 2016. "Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values," TSE Working Papers 16-679, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019. "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2189, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2020.
    2. Daniel F. Garrett, 2019. "Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 375-382, September.
    3. Michi Nishihara & Takashi Shibata, 2018. "Liquidation, fire sales, and acquirers' private information," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-25, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    4. Toomas Hinnosaar, 2013. "Calendar mechanisms," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 304, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    5. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    6. Fabio Antoniou & Raffaele Fiocco, 2019. "Strategic inventories under limited commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(3), pages 695-729, September.
    7. Daniel F. Garrett, 2016. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3275-3299, November.
    8. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2102, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    9. Francesco Nava & Pasquale Schiraldi, 2019. "Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly: A Robust Coase Conjecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(5), pages 1930-1968, May.
    10. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    11. Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Jonathan W. Williams, 2018. "Price Discrimination in International Airline Markets," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 968, Boston College Department of Economics.
    12. Antoniou, Fabio & Fiocco, Raffaele, 2020. "Storable good market with intertemporal cost variations," MPRA Paper 97948, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.

  4. Dilmé, Francesc & Garrett, Daniel, 2015. "Residual Deterrence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10994, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Garrett, Daniel F. & Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Residual Deterrence," TSE Working Papers 19-1029, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

  5. Garrett, Daniel & Gomes, Renato & Maestri, Lucas, 2014. "Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 10036, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Guido Menzio & Nicholas Trachter, 2015. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion Across and Within Stores," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Fabra, Natalia & Montero, Juan Pablo, 2017. "Product Choice and Price Discrimination in Markets with Search Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 12046, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard & Packham, Natalie, 2014. "Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents," CFS Working Paper Series 475, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    4. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2016. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(2), pages 305-370.

  6. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes," Discussion Papers 1579, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Guo, Yingni & Hörner, Johannes, 2015. "Dynamic Mechanisms without Money," Economics Series 310, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    2. Laurence Ales & Pricila Maziero & Pierre Yared, 2012. "A Theory of Political and Economic Cycles," NBER Working Papers 18354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Patrick DeJarnette & David Dillenberger & Daniel Gottlieb & Pietro Ortoleva, 2014. "Time Lotteries and Stochastic Impatience," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 13 Jun 2018.
    4. Sylvain Chassang, 2011. "Calibrated Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 1316, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    5. David Dillenberger & Daniel Gottlieb & Pietro Ortoleva, 2018. "Stochastic Impatience and the Separation of Time and Risk Preferences," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Sep 2018.
    6. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Patrick DeJarnette & David Dillenberger & Daniel Gottlieb & Pietro Ortoleva, 2014. "Time Lotteries, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-026v2, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 12 Jan 2018.
    8. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Zehao Hu, 2014. "Financing Innovation with Unobserved Progress," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    10. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

  7. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 819-853.
    2. LiCalzi, Marco & Pavan, Alessandro, 2005. "Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 227-250, January.
    3. Zhiguo He & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu & Feng Gao, 2016. "Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    4. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane, 2012. "Agency, Firm Growth and Managerial Turnover," CEPR Discussion Papers 9147, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    6. Siegert, Caspar & Trepper, Piers, 2015. "Optimal tolerance for failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 41-55.
    7. Laurence Ales & Pricila Maziero & Pierre Yared, 2012. "A Theory of Political and Economic Cycles," NBER Working Papers 18354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    9. Jin Li & Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell, 2017. "Power Dynamics in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 217-241, February.
    10. Ronald W. Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud, 2013. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2gg54vdji29, Sciences Po.
    11. Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard & Packham, Natalie, 2014. "Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents," CFS Working Paper Series 475, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    12. Becker, Johannes Gerd & Gersbach, Hans, 2017. "A Theory of Threshold Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 11766, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Vasama, Suvi, 2017. "Contracting with long-term consequences," Research Discussion Papers 14/2017, Bank of Finland.
    14. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2102, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    15. Kruse, Thomas & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Optimal stopping with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 702-727.
    16. Carrasco, Vinicius & Orenstein, Paulo & Salgado, Pablo, 2016. "When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 52-61.
    17. Peter M. Demarzo & Yuliy Sannikov, 2017. "Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 182-236.
    18. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2017. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    19. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Jenter, Dirk & Lewellen, Katharina A., 2017. "Performance-induced CEO turnover," CEPR Discussion Papers 12274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 775-818.
    22. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    23. Eső, Péter & Szentes, Balázs, 2017. "Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    24. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 585-593, 04-05.
    25. Marco Battaglini & Rohit Lamba, 2012. "Optimal Dynamic Contracting," Working Papers 1431, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    26. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2014. "How to share it out: The value of information in teams," Discussion Papers 14/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
    27. Zehao Hu, 2014. "Financing Innovation with Unobserved Progress," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    28. Eisfeldt, Andrea L. & Kuhnen, Camelia M., 2013. "CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 351-372.
    29. Battaglini, Marco & Lamba, Rohit, 2019. "Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4).
    30. Peter Eso & Balazs Szentes, 2014. "Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result," 2014 Meeting Papers 605, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    31. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-604.
    32. Brochet, Francois & Limbach, Peter & Schmid, Markus M. & Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik, 2019. "CEO tenure and firm value," CFR Working Papers 16-11, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    33. Ronald W. Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9, Sciences Po.
    34. Suehuyn Kwon, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 6621, CESifo Group Munich.
    35. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    36. Suvi Vasama, 2016. "Dynamic Contracting with Long-Term Consequences: Optimal CEO Compensation and Turnover," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2016-044, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    37. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    38. Suehyun Kwon, 2016. "Relational contracts in a persistent environment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 183-205, January.
    39. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes," Discussion Papers 1579, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

  8. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2009. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 127, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    Cited by:

    1. Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier & Sadzik, Tomasz & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2010. "Dynamic Incentive Accounts," Working Papers 10-19, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    2. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Jean-Pierre Danthine & John Donaldson, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A General Equilibrium Perspective," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 269-286, April.
    4. Xiaojun Zhao, 2015. "Optimal Income Taxations with Information Asymmetry: The Lagrange Multiplier Approach," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 16(1), pages 199-229, May.
    5. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes," Discussion Papers 1579, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

  9. John Bryant & Veronica Jacobsen & Matthew Bell & Daniel Garrett, 2004. "Labour Force Participation and GDP in New Zealand," Treasury Working Paper Series 04/07, New Zealand Treasury.

    Cited by:

    1. Grant Johnston, 2005. "Women’s participation in the labour force," Treasury Working Paper Series 05/06, New Zealand Treasury.
    2. Janneke Plantenga, 2015. "The Economics of Gender Equality – A Review of the Literature in Three Propositions and Two Questions. WWWforEurope Working Paper No. 104," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 58262, February.
    3. M. Cameron & W. Cochrane & J. Poot, 2008. "End-user Informed Demographic Projections for Hamilton up to 2041," Population Studies Centre Discussion Papers dp-66, University of Waikato, Population Studies Centre.
    4. Productivity Commission, 2007. "Potential Benefits of the National Reform Agenda," Research Papers 0701, Productivity Commission, Government of Australia.

Articles

  1. Daniel F Garrett & Renato Gomes & Lucas Maestri, 2019. "Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 1590-1630.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F Garrett, 2019. "Residual Deterrence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1654-1686.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017. "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1258-1301.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Daniel F. Garrett, 2016. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3275-3299, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 775-818.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurence Jacquet & Etienne Lehmann, 2018. "Optimal income taxation with composition effects," Working Papers halshs-01878488, HAL.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    3. Laurence Jacquet & Etienne Lehmann, 2017. "Optimal Income Taxation with Composition Effects," CESifo Working Paper Series 6654, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Kruse, Thomas & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Optimal stopping with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 702-727.
    5. Malin Arve & David Martimort, 2016. "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3238-3274, November.
    6. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2017. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2014. "How to share it out: The value of information in teams," Discussion Papers 14/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
    9. Stanimir Morfov & Manuel Santos, 2017. "A Model of Managerial Talent: Addressing Some Puzzles in CEO Compensation," Working Papers 2017-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    10. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-604.
    11. Williams, Noah, 2015. "A solvable continuous time dynamic principal–agent model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 989-1015.
    12. Ronald W. Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9, Sciences Po.
    13. Rohit Lamba & Ilia Krasikov, 2017. "A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints," 2017 Meeting Papers 1544, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Suehyun Kwon, 2016. "Relational contracts in a persistent environment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 183-205, January.

  7. Garrett, Daniel F., 2014. "Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 631-641.

    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Frankel, 2014. "Aligned Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 66-83, January.
    2. Carrasco, Vinicius & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias & Monteiro, Paulo & Moreira, Humberto, 2018. "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 245-279.
    3. Carroll, Gabriel, 2019. "Robust incentives for information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 382-420.
    4. Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity," Working Papers 15, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2019.
    5. Urmee Khan & Martin Dumav, 2018. "Moral Hazard, Uncertain Technologies, and Linear Contracts," Working Papers 201806, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
    6. Vinicius Carrasco & Vitor Farinha Luz & Paulo Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2015. "Robust Selling Mechanisms," Textos para discussão 641, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    7. Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2015. "Selling to the mean," Working Papers 551, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    8. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-604.
    9. Auster, Sarah, 2018. "Robust contracting under common value uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    10. Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2015. "Selling to the Mean," CESifo Working Paper Series 5443, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Evren, Özgür, 2019. "Recursive non-expected utility: Connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 285-307.
    12. Gabriel Carroll, 2015. "Robustness and Linear Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 536-563, February.
    13. Alfredo Di Tillio & Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2014. "The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 4949, CESifo Group Munich.
    14. Vinicius Carrasco & Vitor Farinha Luz & Paulo K. Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2019. "Robust mechanisms: the curvature case," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 203-222, July.
    15. Carroll, Gabriel, 2016. "Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 334-361.
    16. Juan F. Escobar & Carlos Pulgar, 2016. "Motivating with Simple Contracts," Documentos de Trabajo 325, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    17. Alfredo Di Tillio & Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2012. "The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms," Working Papers 446, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    18. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Locally robust contracts for moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 36-51.

  8. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 10 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (8) 2014-12-29 2015-02-28 2016-01-03 2016-07-30 2016-07-30 2017-08-27 2019-07-29 2019-09-23. Author is listed
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (4) 2014-12-29 2016-07-30 2016-07-30 2019-09-23
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (4) 2010-06-26 2014-12-29 2015-02-28 2017-08-27
  4. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (2) 2016-01-03 2019-07-29
  5. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2010-06-26
  6. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2017-08-27
  7. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (1) 2015-02-28
  8. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2004-06-27
  9. NEP-MKT: Marketing (1) 2016-07-30
  10. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2019-09-23
  11. NEP-TRE: Transport Economics (1) 2016-07-30
  12. NEP-TUR: Tourism Economics (1) 2016-07-30

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Daniel F. Garrett should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.