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Daniel F. Garrett

Personal Details

First Name:Daniel
Middle Name:F.
Last Name:Garrett
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pga626
http://www.dfgarrett.com
Terminal Degree:2012 Department of Economics; Northwestern University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Toulouse, France
http://www.tse-fr.eu/
RePEc:edi:tsetofr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Garrett, Daniel F, 2020. "Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Garrett, Daniel F., 2019. "Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective," TSE Working Papers 19-1037, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  3. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel Garrett, 2019. "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_132, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  4. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," TSE Working Papers 17-830, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  5. Ely, Jeffrey & Garrett, Daniel F. & Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2016. "Overbooking," TSE Working Papers 16-678, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  6. Garrett, Daniel F., 2016. "Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values," TSE Working Papers 16-679, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  7. Dilmé, Francesc & Garrett, Daniel, 2015. "Residual Deterrence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10994, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Garrett, Daniel & Gomes, Renato & Maestri, Lucas, 2014. "Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 10036, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes," Discussion Papers 1579, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2009. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 127, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  12. John Bryant & Veronica Jacobsen & Matthew Bell & Daniel Garrett, 2004. "Labour Force Participation and GDP in New Zealand," Treasury Working Paper Series 04/07, New Zealand Treasury.

Articles

  1. Daniel F Garrett & Renato Gomes & Lucas Maestri, 2019. "Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 1590-1630.
  2. Daniel F. Garrett, 2019. "Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 375-382, September.
  3. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F Garrett, 2019. "Residual Deterrence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1654-1686.
  4. Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017. "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1258-1301.
  5. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
  6. Daniel F. Garrett, 2016. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3275-3299, November.
  7. Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 775-818.
  8. Garrett, Daniel F., 2014. "Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 631-641.
  9. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
  10. Fong, Yuk-fai & Garrett, Daniel F., 2010. "Bidding in a possibly common-value auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 494-501, November.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," TSE Working Papers 17-830, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Dalalah, Doraid & Ojiako, Udechukwu & Chipulu, Maxwell, 2020. "Voluntary overbooking in commercial airline reservations," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    2. Salant, David J. & Cabral, Luís, 2019. "Sequential auctions and auction revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 1-4.
    3. Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017. "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1258-1301.
    4. René Caldentey & Ying Liu & Ilan Lobel, 2017. "Intertemporal Pricing Under Minimax Regret," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(1), pages 104-129, February.
    5. Emil Temnyalov, 2019. "Points mechanisms and rewards programs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 436-457, June.

  2. Ely, Jeffrey & Garrett, Daniel F. & Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2016. "Overbooking," TSE Working Papers 16-678, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Rahul Deb & Maher Said, 2013. "Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-485, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    2. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    3. Akan, Mustafa & Ata, Barış & Dana, James D., 2015. "Revenue management by sequential screening," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 728-774.
    4. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. McAdams, David, 2015. "On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 959-972.

  3. Garrett, Daniel F., 2016. "Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values," TSE Working Papers 16-679, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Philipp Strack, 2019. "Progressive Participation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2189R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2020.
    2. Daniel F. Garrett, 2019. "Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 375-382, September.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(2), pages 235-274, June.
    4. Victor F. Araman & Bassam Fayad, 2021. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Time-Varying Valuations," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 245-265, January.
    5. Dalalah, Doraid & Ojiako, Udechukwu & Chipulu, Maxwell, 2020. "Voluntary overbooking in commercial airline reservations," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    6. Michi Nishihara & Takashi Shibata, 2018. "Liquidation, fire sales, and acquirers' private information," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-25, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    7. Toomas Hinnosaar, 2013. "Calendar mechanisms," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 304, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    8. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    9. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    10. Antoniou, Fabio & Fiocco, Raffaele, 2017. "Strategic inventories under limited commitment," Working Papers 2072/306512, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    11. Amir Ajorlou & Ali Jadbabaie & Ali Kakhbod, 2018. "Dynamic Pricing in Social Networks: The Word-of-Mouth Effect," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 971-979, February.
    12. Nava, Francesco & Schiraldi, Pasquale, 2019. "Differentiated durable goods monopoly: a robust Coase conjecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90512, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Daniel F. Garrett, 2016. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3275-3299, November.
    14. Gaurab Aryal & Charles Murry & Jonathan W. Williams, 2018. "Price Discrimination in International Airline Markets," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 968, Boston College Department of Economics.
    15. Antoniou, Fabio & Fiocco, Raffaele, 2020. "Storable good market with intertemporal cost variations," MPRA Paper 97948, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019. "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers 1904.07456, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
    17. Emil Temnyalov, 2019. "Points mechanisms and rewards programs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 436-457, June.

  4. Dilmé, Francesc & Garrett, Daniel, 2015. "Residual Deterrence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10994, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F Garrett, 2019. "Residual Deterrence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1654-1686.

  5. Garrett, Daniel & Gomes, Renato & Maestri, Lucas, 2014. "Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 10036, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Guido Menzio & Nicholas Trachter, 2015. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion Across and Within Stores," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Fabra, Natalia & Montero, Juan Pablo, 2017. "Product Choice and Price Discrimination in Markets with Search Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 12046, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2013. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking," NBER Working Papers 18936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard & Packham, Natalie, 2014. "Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents," CFS Working Paper Series 475, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    5. Christina E. Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham & Markus Walzl, 2021. "Differentiation and Risk Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(1), pages 1-27.

  6. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes," Discussion Papers 1579, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Guo, Yingni & Hörner, Johannes, 2015. "Dynamic Mechanisms without Money," Economics Series 310, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    2. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Laurence Ales & Pricila Maziero & Pierre Yared, 2012. "A Theory of Political and Economic Cycles," NBER Working Papers 18354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Patrick DeJarnette & David Dillenberger & Daniel Gottlieb & Pietro Ortoleva, 2014. "Time Lotteries and Stochastic Impatience," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 13 Jun 2018.
    5. Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Sylvain Chassang, 2011. "Calibrated Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 1316, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    7. David Dillenberger & Daniel Gottlieb & Pietro Ortoleva, 2018. "Stochastic Impatience and the Separation of Time and Risk Preferences," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Sep 2018.
    8. Patrick DeJarnette & David Dillenberger & Daniel Gottlieb & Pietro Ortoleva, 2014. "Time Lotteries, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-026v2, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 12 Jan 2018.
    9. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Zehao Hu, 2014. "Financing Innovation with Unobserved Progress," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

  7. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Eisfeldt, Andrea L. & Kuhnen, Camelia M., 2013. "CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 351-372.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 819-853.
    3. Battaglini, Marco & Lamba, Rohit, 2019. "Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4).
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(2), pages 235-274, June.
    5. LiCalzi, Marco & Pavan, Alessandro, 2005. "Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 227-250, January.
    6. Peter Eso & Balazs Szentes, 2014. "Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result," 2014 Meeting Papers 605, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Johannes Gerd Becker & Hans Gersbach, 2013. "A Theory of Threshold Contracts," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 13/182, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    8. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-604.
    9. Feng Gao & Zhiguo He & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu, 2016. "Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    10. Brochet, Francois & Limbach, Peter & Schmid, Markus M. & Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik, 2019. "CEO tenure and firm value," CFR Working Papers 16-11, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    11. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2014. "How to Share it out: The Value of Information in Teams," CESifo Working Paper Series 4906, CESifo.
    12. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane, 2012. "Agency, Firm Growth and Managerial Turnover," CEPR Discussion Papers 9147, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    14. Siegert, Caspar & Trepper, Piers, 2015. "Optimal tolerance for failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 41-55.
    15. Laurence Ales & Pricila Maziero & Pierre Yared, 2012. "A Theory of Political and Economic Cycles," NBER Working Papers 18354, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9, Sciences Po.
    17. Suehuyn Kwon, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 6621, CESifo.
    18. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    19. Jin Li & Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell, 2017. "Power Dynamics in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 217-241, February.
    20. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud, 2013. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2gg54vdji29, Sciences Po.
    21. Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard & Packham, Natalie, 2014. "Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents," CFS Working Paper Series 475, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    23. Vasama, Suvi, 2017. "Contracting with long-term consequences," Research Discussion Papers 14/2017, Bank of Finland.
    24. Kruse, Thomas & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Optimal stopping with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 702-727.
    25. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    26. Carrasco, Vinicius & Orenstein, Paulo & Salgado, Pablo, 2016. "When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 52-61.
    27. Suvi Vasama, 2016. "Dynamic Contracting with Long-Term Consequences: Optimal CEO Compensation and Turnover," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2016-044, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    28. Peter M. Demarzo & Yuliy Sannikov, 2017. "Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 182-236.
    29. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    30. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2006. "Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications," Discussion Papers 1496, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    31. Jenter, Dirk & Lewellen, Katharina A., 2017. "Performance-induced CEO turnover," CEPR Discussion Papers 12274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    32. Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 775-818.
    33. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    34. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    35. Eső, Péter & Szentes, Balázs, 2017. "Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    36. Garrett, Daniel F., 2020. "Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting," TSE Working Papers 20-1140, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    37. Suehyun Kwon, 2016. "Relational contracts in a persistent environment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 183-205, January.
    38. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes," Discussion Papers 1579, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    39. Marco Battaglini & Rohit Lamba, 2012. "Optimal Dynamic Contracting," Working Papers 1431, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    40. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Rulebooks in Relational Contracts," Working Papers 2019-7, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    41. Zehao Hu, 2014. "Financing Innovation with Unobserved Progress," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

  8. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2009. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 127, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    Cited by:

    1. Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier & Sadzik, Tomasz & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2009. "Dynamic Incentive Accounts," CEPR Discussion Papers 7497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Jean-Pierre Danthine & John Donaldson, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A General Equilibrium Perspective," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 269-286, April.
    4. Xiaojun Zhao, 2015. "Optimal Income Taxations with Information Asymmetry: The Lagrange Multiplier Approach," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 16(1), pages 199-229, May.
    5. Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 775-818.
    6. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes," Discussion Papers 1579, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

  9. John Bryant & Veronica Jacobsen & Matthew Bell & Daniel Garrett, 2004. "Labour Force Participation and GDP in New Zealand," Treasury Working Paper Series 04/07, New Zealand Treasury.

    Cited by:

    1. M. Cameron & W. Cochrane & J. Poot, 2008. "End-user Informed Demographic Projections for Hamilton up to 2041," Population Studies Centre Discussion Papers dp-66, University of Waikato, Population Studies Centre.
    2. Productivity Commission, 2007. "Potential Benefits of the National Reform Agenda," Research Papers 0701, Productivity Commission, Government of Australia.
    3. Grant Johnston, 2005. "Women’s participation in the labour force," Treasury Working Paper Series 05/06, New Zealand Treasury.
    4. Janneke Plantenga, 2015. "The Economics of Gender Equality – A Review of the Literature in Three Propositions and Two Questions. WWWforEurope Working Paper No. 104," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 58262.

Articles

  1. Daniel F Garrett & Renato Gomes & Lucas Maestri, 2019. "Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 1590-1630.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F Garrett, 2019. "Residual Deterrence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1654-1686.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Jeffrey C. Ely & Daniel F. Garrett & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2017. "Overbooking," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(6), pages 1258-1301.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Daniel F. Garrett, 2016. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3275-3299, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 775-818.

    Cited by:

    1. Pawel Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2020. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 20/721, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    2. Jacquet, Laurence & Lehmann, Etienne, 2017. "Optimal Income Taxation with Composition Effects," IZA Discussion Papers 11019, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-604.
    4. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2014. "How to Share it out: The Value of Information in Teams," CESifo Working Paper Series 4906, CESifo.
    5. Williams, Noah, 2015. "A solvable continuous time dynamic principal–agent model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 989-1015.
    6. Malin Arve & David Martimort, 2016. "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01509599, HAL.
    7. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9, Sciences Po.
    8. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
    9. Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Rohit Lamba & Ilia Krasikov, 2017. "A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints," 2017 Meeting Papers 1544, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Kruse, Thomas & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Optimal stopping with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 702-727.
    12. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Garrett, Daniel F., 2020. "Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting," TSE Working Papers 20-1140, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    14. Suehyun Kwon, 2016. "Relational contracts in a persistent environment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 183-205, January.
    15. Stanimir Morfov & Manuel Santos, 2017. "A Model of Managerial Talent: Addressing Some Puzzles in CEO Compensation," Working Papers 2017-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.

  7. Garrett, Daniel F., 2014. "Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 631-641.

    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Frankel, 2014. "Aligned Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(1), pages 66-83, January.
    2. Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2015. "Selling to the mean," Working Papers 551, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    3. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-604.
    4. Carrasco, Vinicius & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias & Monteiro, Paulo & Moreira, Humberto, 2018. "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 245-279.
    5. Carroll, Gabriel, 2019. "Robust incentives for information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 382-420.
    6. Li, Zhaolin, 2021. "Robust Moral Hazard with Distributional Ambiguity," Working Papers BAWP-2021-01, University of Sydney Business School, Discipline of Business Analytics.
    7. Ehsan Bolandifar & Tianjun Feng & Fuqiang Zhang, 2018. "Simple Contracts to Assure Supply Under Noncontractible Capacity and Asymmetric Cost Information," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 20(2), pages 217-231, May.
    8. Auster, Sarah, 2018. "Robust contracting under common value uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    9. Evren, Özgür, 2019. "Recursive non-expected utility: Connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 285-307.
    10. Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity," Working Papers 15, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2019.
    11. Gabriel Carroll, 2015. "Robustness and Linear Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 536-563, February.
    12. Alfredo Di Tillio & Nenad Kos & Matthias Messner, 2014. "The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 4949, CESifo.
    13. Vinicius Carrasco & Vitor Farinha Luz & Paulo K. Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2019. "Robust mechanisms: the curvature case," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 203-222, July.
    14. Urmee Khan & Martin Dumav, 2018. "Moral Hazard, Uncertain Technologies, and Linear Contracts," Working Papers 201806, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
    15. Carroll, Gabriel, 2016. "Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 334-361.
    16. Li, Zhaolin, 2020. "Robust Moral Hazard with Distributional Ambiguity," Working Papers BAWP-2020-03, University of Sydney Business School, Discipline of Business Analytics.
    17. Juan F. Escobar & Carlos Pulgar, 2016. "Motivating with Simple Contracts," Documentos de Trabajo 325, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    18. Vinicius Carrasco & Vitor Farinha Luz & Paulo Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2015. "Robust Selling Mechanisms," Textos para discussão 641, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
    19. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Locally robust contracts for moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 36-51.

  8. Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

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Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 12 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (10) 2014-12-29 2015-02-28 2016-01-03 2016-07-30 2016-07-30 2017-08-27 2019-07-29 2019-09-23 2020-06-22 2020-06-22. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (6) 2010-06-26 2014-12-29 2015-02-28 2017-08-27 2020-06-22 2020-06-22. Author is listed
  3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (4) 2014-12-29 2016-07-30 2016-07-30 2019-09-23
  4. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2017-08-27 2020-06-22
  5. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (2) 2015-02-28 2020-06-22
  6. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (2) 2016-01-03 2019-07-29
  7. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2010-06-26
  8. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2004-06-27
  9. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages (1) 2020-06-22
  10. NEP-MKT: Marketing (1) 2016-07-30
  11. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2019-09-23
  12. NEP-TRE: Transport Economics (1) 2016-07-30
  13. NEP-TUR: Tourism Economics (1) 2016-07-30

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