Managerial Turnover in a Changing World
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- Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879-925.
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More about this item
Keywords
managerial turnover; termination clauses; dynamic mechanism design; adverse selection; moral hazard;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2010-06-26 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2010-06-26 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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