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Report NEP-MIC-2020-06-22
This is the archive for NEP-MIC, a report on new working papers in the area of Microeconomics. Jing-Yuan Chiou issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-MIC
The following items were announced in this report:
- Athey, Susan & Bryan, Kevin & Gans, Joshua S., 2020, "The Allocation of Decision Authority to Human and Artificial Intelligence," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3856, Jan.
- Sai Krishna Kamepalli & Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2020, "Kill Zone," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 27146, May.
- Masaki Aoyagi, 2020, "Connecting Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1089, Jun.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Castro, Francisco & Weintraub, Gabriel, 2020, "Uniform Pricing versus Third-Degree Price Discrimination," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3860, Feb.
- Garrett, Daniel & Dilmé, Francesc, 2020, "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14722, May.
- Schmutzler, Armin & Hefti, Andreas & Liu, Shuo, 2020, "Preferences, Confusion and Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14700, May.
- Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2020, "Comparative Politics with Intraparty Candidate Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14763, May.
- Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2019, "Reputation and screening in a noisy environment with irreversible actions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 100885, Aug.
- Hebert, Benjamin & La'O, Jennifer, 2020, "Information Acquisition, Efficiency, and Non-fundamental Volatility," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3836, Feb.
- Fischer, Christian, 2020, "Optimal payment contracts in trade relationships," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 100891, Jun.
- Hülya Eraslan & Kirill Evdokimov & Jan Zápal, 2020, "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1090, Jun.
- Michel Grabisch & Alexis Poindron & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2019, "A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-02799707, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103773.
- Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun C. & Siemering, Christian, 2020, "Advertisement-Financed Credit Ratings," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14735, May.
- Garrett, Daniel, 2020, "Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14725, May.
- Moraga-González, José-Luis & Watanabe, Makoto, 2020, "Selling Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14718, May.
- Kiho Yoon, 2020, "The uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms on restricted domains," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 2004.
- Chen, Daniel & Duffie, Darrell, 2020, "Market Fragmentation," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3854, Feb.
- Morelli, Massimo & Gratton, Gabriele, 2020, "Optimal Checks and Balances Under Policy Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 14745, May.
- Yu-Jui Huang & Zhenhua Wang, 2020, "Optimal Equilibria for Multi-dimensional Time-inconsistent Stopping Problems," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2006.00754, Jun, revised Jan 2021.
- V. K. Oikonomou & J. Jost, 2020, "Periodic Strategies II: Generalizations and Extensions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2005.12832, May.
- Gur, Yonatan & Macnamara, Gregory & Saban, Daniela, 2020, "On the Disclosure of Promotion Value in Platforms with Learning Sellers," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3865.