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Preferences, Confusion and Competition

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  • Hefti, Andreas
  • Liu, Shuo
  • Schmutzler, Armin

Abstract

Do firms seek to make the market transparent, or do they confuse consumers in their product perceptions? We show that the answer to this question depends decisively on preference heterogeneity. Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, confusion is not necessarily an equilibrium in markets with differentiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are relatively rare, firms strive to fully educate consumers. By contrast, if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion becomes part of the equilibrium strategies. The adverse welfare consequences of confusion can be more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also choose a dominated option, or inefficiently refrain from buying. Qualitatively similar insights obtain for political contests, in which candidates compete for voters with heterogeneous preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Hefti, Andreas & Liu, Shuo & Schmutzler, Armin, 2020. "Preferences, Confusion and Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 14700, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14700
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    consumer confusion; differentiated products; obfuscation; polarized/indecisive preferences; Political Competition; price competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • M30 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - General

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