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The Electoral Implications of Candidate Ambiguity

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  • TOMZ, MICHAEL
  • VAN HOUWELING, ROBERT P.

Abstract

Candidates often make ambiguous statements about the policies they intend to pursue. In theory, ambiguity affects how voters make choices and who wins elections. In practice, measurement and endogeneity problems have impeded empirical research about the consequences of ambiguity. We conducted survey experiments that overcame these obstacles by manipulating a common form of ambiguity: the imprecision of candidate positions. Our data show that, on average, ambiguity does not repel and may, in fact, attract voters. In nonpartisan settings, voters who have neutral or positive attitudes toward risk, or who feel uncertain about their own policy preferences, tend to embrace ambiguity. In partisan settings, voters respond even more positively to ambiguity; they optimistically perceive the locations of ambiguous candidates from their own party without pessimistically perceiving the locations of vague candidates from the opposition. We further find, through analysis of two additional new data sets, that candidates often take—and voters frequently perceive—ambiguous positions like the ones in our experiments. The pervasive use of ambiguity in campaigns fits with our experimental finding that ambiguity can be a winning strategy, especially in partisan elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomz, Michael & Van Houweling, Robert P., 2009. "The Electoral Implications of Candidate Ambiguity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(1), pages 83-98, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:103:y:2009:i:01:p:83-98_09
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Knight & Fan Li & Lindsey Woodworth, 2017. "It’s My Party and I’ll Vote How I Want to: Experimental Evidence of Directional Voting in Two-Candidate Elections," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 43(4), pages 660-676, September.
    2. Peter Grand & Guido Tiemann, 2013. "Projection effects and specification bias in spatial models of European Parliament elections," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(4), pages 497-521, December.
    3. Tørstad, Vegard & Wiborg, Vegard, 2023. "Commitment Ambiguity and Ambition in Climate Pledges," Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Working Paper Series qt7gd693zp, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California.
    4. Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & D'Agostino, Elena & Pavesi, Filippo, 2023. "Watch your words: An experimental study on communication and the opportunity cost of delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 216-232.
    5. Nichole Szembrot, 2017. "Are voters cursed when politicians conceal policy preferences?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 25-41, October.
    6. Cristina Gualdani & Shruti Sinha, 2023. "Identification in Discrete Choice Models with Imperfect Information," Working Papers 949, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    7. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T., 2017. "Modes of ambiguous communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 271-292.
    8. Rory McDonald & Cheng Gao, 2019. "Pivoting Isn’t Enough? Managing Strategic Reorientation in New Ventures," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(6), pages 1289-1318, November.
    9. Andreas Hefti & Shuo Liu & Armin Schmutzler, 2022. "Preferences, Confusion and Competition," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(645), pages 1852-1881.
    10. Zobel, Malisa & Lehmann, Pola, 2018. "Positions and saliency of immigration in party manifestos: A novel dataset using crowd coding," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 57(4), pages 1056-1083.
    11. John Sillince & Paula Jarzabkowski & Duncan Shaw, 2012. "Shaping Strategic Action Through the Rhetorical Construction and Exploitation of Ambiguity," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 630-650, June.
    12. Kawamura, Kohei & Kobashi, Yohei & Shizume, Masato & Ueda, Kozo, 2019. "Strategic central bank communication: Discourse analysis of the Bank of Japan’s Monthly Report," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 230-250.
    13. Georgia Kernell, 2016. "Strategic party heterogeneity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(3), pages 408-430, July.
    14. Vardan, Baghdasaryan & Elena, Manzoni, 2016. "Set them (almost) free. Discretion in electoral campaigns under asymmetric information," Working Papers 354, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 13 Dec 2016.
    15. Robert Liñeira, 2021. "Valence Secession? Voting Shocks and Independence Support in Scotland," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(4), pages 399-411.
    16. Rothengatter, Marloes, 2016. "Insights in cognitive patterns : Essays on heuristics and identification," Other publications TiSEM 5f812a9d-8968-48b8-8d1b-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    17. Sivan Frenkel, 2014. "Competence and ambiguity in electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 219-234, April.
    18. Nick Obradovich & Scott M. Guenther, 2016. "Collective responsibility amplifies mitigation behaviors," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 307-319, July.
    19. Woon, Jonathan & Kanthak, Kristin, 2019. "Elections, ability, and candidate honesty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 735-753.

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