Watch your Words: An Experimental Study on Communication and the Opportunity Cost of Delegation
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Armenak Antinyan & Luca Corazzini & Elena D'Agostino & Filippo Pavesi, 2017. "Watch your Words: an Experimental Study on Communication and the Opportunity Cost of Delegation," Working Papers 18/2017, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2000.
"Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers 040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series 336, CESifo.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1990.
"Communication between rational agents,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June.
- M. Rabin, 2010. "Communication Between Rational Agents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 539, David K. Levine.
- Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017.
"Promises and expectations,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 161-178.
- Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer, 2013. "Promises and Expectations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1931, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2016.
- Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer, 2014. "Promises and Expectations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000887, David K. Levine.
- Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer, 2013. "Promises and Expectations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1931R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2017.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2010.
"Testing guilt aversion,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 95-107, January.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2007. "Testing Guilt Aversion," Working Papers in Economics 14/07, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2007. "Testing Guilt Aversion," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 683, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Promises, Threats and Fairness," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 397-420, April.
- Marta Serra-Garcia & Eric van Damme & Jan Potters, 2013.
"Lying About What You Know Or About What You Do?,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(5), pages 1204-1229, October.
- Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2013. "Lying about what you know or about what you do?," Other publications TiSEM da16de2e-0e5f-4eeb-ad4b-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2017.
"Honesty and informal agreements,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 269-285.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Maros Servátka & Radovan Vadovic, 2015. "Honesty and Informal Agreements," Working Papers 538, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Maroš Servátka & Radovan Vadovič, 2015. "Honesty and Informal Agreements," Working Papers in Economics 15/04, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2016. "Honesty and Informal Agreements," MPRA Paper 73442, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tanjim Hossain & Ryo Okui, 2013. "The Binarized Scoring Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(3), pages 984-1001.
- Maroš Servátka & Radovan Vadovič, 2009.
"Unequal outside options in the lost wallet game,"
Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 2870-2883.
- Maroš Servátka & Radovan Vadovič, 2009. "Unequal Outside Options in the Lost Wallet Game," Working Papers in Economics 09/14, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Benabou, Roland & Falk, Armin & Tirole, Jean, 2018.
"Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning,"
IZA Discussion Papers
11665, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Roland Bénabou & Armin Falk & Jean Tirole, 2019. "Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_070, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Roland Bénabou & Armin Falk & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning," NBER Working Papers 24798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roland Bènabou & Armin Falk & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Narratives, Imperatives and Moral Reasoning," Working Papers 2018-049, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Bénabou, Roland & Falk, Armin & Tirole, Jean, 2018. "Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning," CEPR Discussion Papers 13056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Roland Benabou & Armin Falk & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning," Working Papers id:12918, eSocialSciences.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009.
"Dynamic psychological games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-35, January.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Working Papers 287, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Cadsby, C. Bram & Du, Ninghua & Song, Fei & Yao, Lan, 2015.
"Promise keeping, relational closeness, and identifiability: An experimental investigation in China,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 120-133.
- C. Bram Cadsby & Ninghua Du & Fei Song & Lan Yao, 2014. "Promise Keeping, Relational Closeness, And Identifiability: An Experimental Investigation In China," Working Papers 1405, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Farrell Joseph, 1993.
"Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
- Farrell, Joseph, 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4968n3fz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- J. Farrell, 2010. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap Talk Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 533, David K. Levine.
- Joseph Farrell., 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Economics Working Papers 8609, University of California at Berkeley.
- Robert J. Shiller, 2017.
"Narrative Economics,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(4), pages 967-1004, April.
- Robert J. Shiller, 2017. "Narrative Economics," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2069, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Robert J. Shiller, 2017. "Narrative Economics," NBER Working Papers 23075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Servátka, Maroš & Tucker, Steven & Vadovič, Radovan, 2011.
"Words speak louder than money,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 700-709.
- Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovič, 2008. "Words Speak Louder Than Money," Working Papers in Economics 08/18, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovič, 2011. "Words Speak Louder Than Money," Working Papers in Economics 11/13, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Damme, Eric & Potters, Jan, 2011.
"Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 244-261, September.
- Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Hiding an Inconvenient Truth : Lies and Vagueness," Discussion Paper 2010-029, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Hiding an Inconvenient Truth : Lies and Vagueness," Other publications TiSEM 4b2421f3-f39c-4012-afef-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Ying Chen & Navin Kartik & Joel Sobel, 2008. "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(1), pages 117-136, January.
- Christoph Vanberg, 2008. "Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1467-1480, November.
- Ben-Ner, Avner & Putterman, Louis, 2009.
"Trust, communication and contracts: An experiment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 106-121, May.
- Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, "undated". "Trust, Communication and Contracts: An Experiment," Working Papers 0206, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
- Alessandra Casella & Navin Kartik & Luis Sanchez & Sébastien Turban, 2018.
"Communication in context: Interpreting promises in an experiment on competition and trust,"
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 115(5), pages 933-938, January.
- Casella, Alessandra & Kartik, Navin & Sanchez, Luis & Turban, Sébastien, 2018. "Communication in Context: Interpreting Promises in an Experiment on Competition and Trust," CEPR Discussion Papers 12709, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Khalmetski, Kiryl, 2016. "Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 110-119.
- Sivan Frenkel, 2014. "Competence and ambiguity in electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 219-234, April.
- Harrison, Glenn W. & Martínez-Correa, Jimmy & Swarthout, J. Todd, 2014.
"Eliciting subjective probabilities with binary lotteries,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 128-140.
- Glenn W. Harrison & Jimmy MartÃnez-Correa & J. Todd Swarthout, 2012. "Eliciting Subjective Probabilities with Binary Lotteries," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2012-16, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Jun 2014.
- Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2007. "Guilt in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 170-176, May.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2016.
"Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(3), pages 648-667, March.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2013. "Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game," Working Papers 246, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2013.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2013. "Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game," Working Papers 480, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2016. "Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game," Post-Print hal-01723199, HAL.
- Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003.
"Promises & Partnership,"
Research Papers in Economics
2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Charness, Gary B & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2006. "Promises & Partnership," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0127h86v, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Mariana Blanco & Dirk Engelmann & Alexander Koch & Hans-Theo Normann, 2010.
"Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem?,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(4), pages 412-438, December.
- Blanco, Mariana & Engelmann, Dirk & Koch, Alexander K. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2008. "Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is there a Hedging Problem?," IZA Discussion Papers 3517, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
- Marina Agranov & Andrew Schotter, 2012. "Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 77-103, May.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2013.
"Deception: The role of guilt,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 227-232.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2012. "Deception: The Role of Guilt," Working Papers 457, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Seidmann, Daniel J., 1990. "Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 445-458, April.
- Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006.
"Promises and Partnership,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
- Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "Promises and Partnership," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Marco Ottaviani & Francesco Squintani, 2006. "Naive audience and communication bias," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 129-150, December.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2000. "Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 163-182, February.
- Donald L. Ferrin & Kurt T. Dirks, 2003. "The Use of Rewards to Increase and Decrease Trust: Mediating Processes and Differential Effects," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(1), pages 18-31, February.
- Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
- George A. Akerlof & Robert J. Shiller, 2015. "Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10534.
- Agranov, Marina & Schotter, Andrew, 2013. "Language and government coordination: An experimental study of communication in the announcement game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 26-39.
- Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2010. "Bare promises: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 281-283, May.
- McKelvey, Richard D & Page, Talbot, 1990. "Public and Private Information: An Experimental Study of Information Pooling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1321-1339, November.
- Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
- Daniel Houser & Erte Xiao, 2011. "Classification of natural language messages using a coordination game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(1), pages 1-14, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Tebbe, Eva & Wegener, Benjamin, 2022. "Is natural language processing the cheap charlie of analyzing cheap talk? A horse race between classifiers on experimental communication data," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Khalmetski, Kiryl, 2019. "Evasion of guilt in expert advice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 296-310.
- Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010.
"Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139),"
Discussion Paper
2010-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)," Other publications TiSEM b0e6e06d-c2e1-4a79-b477-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Roman Inderst & Kiryl Khalmetski & Axel Ockenfels, 2019.
"Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(7), pages 3322-3336, July.
- Roman Inderst & Kiryl Khalmetski & Axel Ockenfels, 2017. "Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire," Working Paper Series in Economics 90, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
- Inderst, Roman, 2019. "Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire," CEPR Discussion Papers 13711, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cartwright, Edward, 2019. "A survey of belief-based guilt aversion in trust and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 430-444.
- Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Martin Dufwenberg & Stefano Papa, 2021.
"Promises and Partner-Switch,"
Working Papers in Public Economics
215, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
- DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni, & DUFWENBERG, Martin & PAPA, Stefano, 2021. "Promises and Partner-Switch," Working Papers 2021005, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
- Khalmetski, Kiryl, 2016. "Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 110-119.
- Riccardo Ghidoni & Matteo Ploner, 2014. "When do the Expectations of Others Matter? An Experiment on Distributional Justice and Guilt Aversion," CEEL Working Papers 1403, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017.
"Promises and expectations,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 161-178.
- Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer, 2013. "Promises and Expectations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1931, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2016.
- Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer, 2014. "Promises and Expectations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000887, David K. Levine.
- Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer, 2013. "Promises and Expectations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1931R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2017.
- Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc & Walzl, Markus, 2015.
"Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-12.
- Ronald Peeters & Marc Vorsatz & Markus Walzl, 2012. "Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment," Working Papers 2012-17, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck, revised Nov 2014.
- Woods, Daniel & Servátka, Maroš, 2016.
"Testing psychological forward induction and the updating of beliefs in the lost wallet game,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 116-125.
- Woods, Daniel & Servátka, Maroš, 2016. "Testing Psychological Forward Induction and the Updating of Beliefs in the Lost Wallet Game," MPRA Paper 69957, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Beck, Adrian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Qiu, Jianying & Sutter, Matthias, 2013. "Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: Guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 145-164.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2022.
"Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: Does Partners’ Payoff Vulnerability Matter?,"
Working Papers
2203, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Villeval, 2023. "Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: Does Partners' Payoff Vulnerability Matter?," Working Papers halshs-03620418, HAL.
- Loukas Balafoutas & Helena Fornwagner, 2017.
"The limits of guilt,"
Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(2), pages 137-148, December.
- Loukas Balafoutas & Helena Fornwagner, 2016. "The limits of guilt," Working Papers 2016-09, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2014. "For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 173-199, June.
- Eric Cardella, 2016. "Exploiting the guilt aversion of others: do agents do it and is it effective?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(4), pages 523-560, April.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2016.
"Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(3), pages 648-667, March.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2013. "Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game," Working Papers 246, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2013.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2013. "Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game," Working Papers 480, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2016. "Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game," Post-Print hal-01723199, HAL.
- Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2010. "Bare promises: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 281-283, May.
- Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
- Bracht, Jürgen & Regner, Tobias, 2013.
"Moral emotions and partnership,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 313-326.
- Jürgen Bracht & Tobias Regner, 2011. "Moral Emotions and Partnership," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-028, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Sanjit Dhami, 2017. "Human Ethics and Virtues: Rethinking the Homo-Economicus Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 6836, CESifo.
More about this item
Keywords
Communication; Trust; Language Precision; Delegation; Deception;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2019-11-18 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2019-11-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2019-11-18 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2019:31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dsvenit.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Geraldine Ludbrook (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dsvenit.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.