Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire
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- Roman Inderst & Kiryl Khalmetski & Axel Ockenfels, 2019. "Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(7), pages 3322-3336, July.
- Inderst, Roman, 2019. "Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire," CEPR Discussion Papers 13711, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Cited by:
- Lucas C. Coffman & Alexander Gotthard-Real, 2019. "Moral Perceptions of Advised Actions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(8), pages 3904-3927, August.
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More about this item
Keywords
Shared guilt; trust; guilt aversion; responsibility diffusion; financial advice;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Statistics
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