Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2
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- Charles Bellemare & Alexander Sebald & Sigrid Suetens, 2017. "Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects," Cahiers de recherche 1708, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019.
"Embezzlement and guilt aversion,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 409-429.
- Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2018. "Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion," IZA Discussion Papers 11956, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Embezzlement and guilt aversion," Post-Print halshs-02073561, HAL.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion," Working Papers halshs-01981632, HAL.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2018. "Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion," Working Papers halshs-01779145, HAL.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2018. "Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion," Working Papers 1807, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Natalia Montinari & Michela Rancan, 2018. "Risk taking on behalf of others: The role of social distance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 81-109, August.
- Bellemare, Charles & Sebald, A. & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019. "Guilt Aversion in Economics and Psychology," Other publications TiSEM 5dca2a21-519f-4f5a-834d-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Bellemare, Charles & Sebald, Alexander & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019. "Guilt aversion in economics and psychology," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 52-59.
- Bellemare, Charles & Sebald, A. & Suetens, Sigrid, 2019. "Guilt Aversion in Economics and Psychology," Discussion Paper 2019-017, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2020. "Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: the Role of Vulnerability," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-15, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Patel, Amrish & Smith, Alec, 2019. "Guilt and participation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 279-295.
- Morell, Alexander, 2019. "The short arm of guilt – An experiment on group identity and guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 332-345.
More about this item
Keywords
Guilt sensitivity; Psychological game theory; Heterogeneity; Stakes; Dictator game;JEL classification:
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
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