Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation using Equilibrium ad Stated Belief Models
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- Charles Bellemare & Alexander Sebald & Martin Strobel, 2011. "Measuring the willingness to pay to avoid guilt: estimation using equilibrium and stated belief models," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 437-453, April.
- Bellemare, Charles & Sebald, Alexander & Strobel, Martin, 2010. "Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation Using Equilibrium and Stated Belief Models," IZA Discussion Papers 4803, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Charles Bellemare & Alexander Sebald & Martin Strobel, 2010. "Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation using Equilibrium and Stated Belief Models," Discussion Papers 10-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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More about this item
KeywordsGuilt aversion; Willingness to pay; Equilibrium and stated beliefs models;
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-03-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-DCM-2010-03-13 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-EXP-2010-03-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2010-03-13 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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