Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs
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- Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
- Khalmetski, Kiryl & Rockenbach, Bettina & Werner, Peter, 2017. "Evasive Lying in Strategic Communication," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168119, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2014. "For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 173-199, June.
- Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Luigi Luini, 2017. "Does Focality Depend on the Mode of Cognition? Experimental Evidence on Pure Coordination Games," Department of Economics University of Siena 771, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Armenak Antinyan & Luca Corazzini & Elena D'Agostino & Filippo Pavesi, 2017. "Watch your Words: an Experimental Study on Communication and the Opportunity Cost of Delegation," Working Papers 18/2017, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
- Ginger Zhe Jin & Michael Luca & Daniel Martin, 2015. "Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure," NBER Working Papers 21099, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Buyukboyaci, Muruvvet & Kucuksenel, Serkan, 2016. "Coordination and Cheap Talk: Indirect versus Direct Messages," MPRA Paper 68964, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2015.
"Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 14-25.
- Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2015. "Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Cheap Talk Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-012/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Agranov, Marina & Schotter, Andrew, 2013. "Language and government coordination: An experimental study of communication in the announcement game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 26-39.
- Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-153/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- repec:eee:pubeco:v:156:y:2017:i:c:p:59-72 is not listed on IDEAS
- Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till & Bizer, Kilian & Spiwoks, Markus, 2015. "Strategic coordination in forecasting – An experimental study," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 155-162.
- Bizer, Kilian & Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till & Spiwoks, Markus, 2014. "Strategic coordination in forecasting: An experimental study," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 195, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
More about this item
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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