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Competence and ambiguity in electoral competition

Listed author(s):
  • Sivan Frenkel

    ()

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    The level of competence that voters attribute to different candidates is an important determinant of election results. In addition, it is observed that some candidates tend to be more ambiguous in their campaigns regarding future plans, while others commit to specific policies. We offer a model where politicians who vary in their level of competence compete by making costly campaign declarations. We show that a separating equilibrium exists in which the ambiguity of a candidate’s campaign declaration reveals her level of competence. The model explains how politicians may use an “issue”-based campaign to create a competent image, and provides an additional explanation for different levels of campaign ambiguity. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-012-0039-5
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 159 (2014)
    Issue (Month): 1 (April)
    Pages: 219-234

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:1:p:219-234
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-0039-5
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

    Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2

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