Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations
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- Ran Spiegler, 2005. "Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000535, UCLA Department of Economics.
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More about this item
KeywordsBounded rationality; industrial organization; multi-dimensional pricing; law of small numbers; market exploitation; obfuscation;
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Other
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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