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Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Beuve

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, GREGOR - Groupe de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School)

  • Stéphane Saussier

    (GREGOR - Groupe de Recherche en Gestion des Organisations - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School)

Abstract

In this article, we use a large database of more than 3700 interfirm relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they achieve cooperation. We find that cooperation is enhanced by a partner's reputation. Our results also suggest that while formal contracts have a direct negative impact on ex-post cooperation, they are an enhancing factor of cooperative behaviors as soon as the intrinsic hazards of the relationship require higher ex-ante contractual safeguards to secure agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Beuve & Stéphane Saussier, 2012. "Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00820706, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00820706
    DOI: 10.1093/icc/dtr059
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    Cited by:

    1. Joel Watson & David A. Miller & Trond E. Olsen, 2020. "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(7), pages 2153-2197, July.
    2. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
    3. Fu, Tong, 2020. "The dilemma of government intervention in a firm's financing: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    4. Fu, Tong & Jian, Ze, 2018. "Property rights protection, financial access and corporate R&D: Evidence from a large representative sample of Chinese firms," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 332-345.
    5. Wenhua Hou & Xiaoqi Peng & Lin Wang, 2024. "The Influence of Contractual and Relational Governance on the Sustainable Performance of Public-Private Partnership Projects: Findings from PLS-SEM and fsQCA," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(3), pages 10826-10852, September.

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