Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract
In this article, we use a large database of more than 3700 interfirm relationships in force between French firms in 2003 to study the way they achieve cooperation. We find that cooperation is enhanced by a partner's reputation. Our results also suggest that while formal contracts have a direct negative impact on ex-post cooperation, they are an enhancing factor of cooperative behaviors as soon as the intrinsic hazards of the relationship require higher ex-ante contractual safeguards to secure agreements. Copyright 2012 The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Associazione ICC. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 21 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
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