IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/sbusec/v44y2015i4p867-888.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Trust, transaction costs and contractual incompleteness in franchising

Author

Listed:
  • George Hendrikse
  • Patrick Hippmann
  • Josef Windsperger

Abstract

The aim of this study is to address empirically the degree of contractual completeness in franchising by combining transaction cost and relational governance perspectives. First, the ratio of specific and residual decision rights is developed as a measure of contractual completeness. Second, we extend the transaction cost perspective of contractual completeness in franchising by arguing that the franchisor’s and franchisees’ investments have a negative effect on contractual completeness under bilateral dependence and a positive effect under unilateral dependence. Third, we complement the transaction cost perspective by developing new hypotheses regarding the impact of general and knowledge-based trust on contractual completeness. General trust of the franchisor reduces the franchisor’s perception of relational risk and hence the necessity to control the network relationship by more complete contract planning, and knowledge-based trust increases information sharing between the partners and hence the knowledge base for specifying more detailed contracts. The data from the German franchise sector provide some support of the hypotheses. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • George Hendrikse & Patrick Hippmann & Josef Windsperger, 2015. "Trust, transaction costs and contractual incompleteness in franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 867-888, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:44:y:2015:i:4:p:867-888
    DOI: 10.1007/s11187-014-9626-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11187-014-9626-9
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11187-014-9626-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud, 2000. "Créance résiduelle et flux de rentes comme mécanismes incitatifs dans les contrats de franchise : compléments ou substituts ?," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 255-276.
    2. Jean Tirole, 2009. "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 265-294, March.
    3. Malhotra, Deepak & Lumineau, Fabrice, 2011. "Trust and collaboration in the aftermath of conflict: the effects of contract structure," MPRA Paper 38358, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 2005. "Contract Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262025760, December.
    5. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-261, October.
    6. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring.
    7. Joskow, Paul L, 1988. "Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 95-117, Spring.
    8. George Hendrikse & Mika Tuunanen & Josef Windsperger & Gérard Cliquet, 2008. "Strategy and Governance of Networks," Post-Print halshs-00480202, HAL.
    9. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2002. "Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 798-817, September.
    10. Windsperger, Josef, 2004. "Centralization of franchising networks: evidence from the Austrian franchise sector," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 57(12), pages 1361-1369, December.
    11. Reuer, Jeffrey J. & Arino, Africa & Mellewigt, Thomas, 2006. "Entrepreneurial alliances as contractual forms," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 306-325, May.
    12. Benjamin Klein, 2000. "The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 67-80.
    13. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1997. "Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, March.
    14. Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(3), pages 444-463, July.
    15. Wimmer, Bradley S & Garen, John E, 1997. "Moral Hazard, Asset Specificity, Implicit Bonding, and Compensation: The Case of Franchising," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 544-554, July.
    16. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
    17. Paul L. Joskow, 1990. "The Performance of Long-Term Contracts: Further Evidence from Coal Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(2), pages 251-274, Summer.
    18. Kaufmann, Patrick J. & Eroglu, Sevgin, 1999. "Standardization and adaptation in business format franchising," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 69-85, January.
    19. Elizabeth Spencer, 2008. "Conditions for effective disclosure in the regulation of franchising," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 509-525.
    20. Yamei Hu & George Hendrikse, 2009. "Allocation of Decision Rights in Fruit and Vegetable Contracts in China," International Studies of Management & Organization, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(4), pages 8-30, January.
    21. Chen, Yongmin, 2000. "Promises, Trust, and Contracts," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 209-232, April.
    22. Elfenbein, Daniel W & Lerner, Josh, 2003. "Ownership and Control Rights in Internet Portal Alliances, 1995-1999," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 356-369, Summer.
    23. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315.
    24. Christopher Hayter, 2013. "Conceptualizing knowledge-based entrepreneurship networks: perspectives from the literature," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 899-911, December.
    25. Shannon W. Anderson & Henri C. Dekker, 2005. "Management Control for Market Transactions: The Relation Between Transaction Characteristics, Incomplete Contract Design, and Subsequent Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(12), pages 1734-1752, December.
    26. Arruñada Benito & Garicano Luis & Vázquez Luis, 2005. "Completing Contracts Ex Post: How Car Manufacturers Manage Car Dealers," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 149-173, April.
    27. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
    28. Armstrong, J. Scott & Overton, Terry S., 1977. "Estimating Nonresponse Bias in Mail Surveys," MPRA Paper 81694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    29. Kyle J. Mayer & Nicholas S. Argyres, 2004. "Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(4), pages 394-410, August.
    30. Higgins, Matthew J., 2007. "The allocation of control rights in pharmaceutical alliances," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 58-75, March.
    31. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, 2000. "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 989-1017.
    32. Arrunada, Benito & Garicano, Luis & Vazquez, Luis, 2001. "Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 257-284, April.
    33. Dnes, Antony W, 1993. "A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 367-393, June.
    34. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    35. Klein, Benjamin, 1995. "The economics of franchise contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(1-2), pages 9-37, October.
    36. Akbar Zaheer & N. Venkatraman, 1995. "Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 373-392.
    37. Thomas Mellewigt & Anoop Madhok & Antoinette Weibel, 2007. "Trust and formal contracts in interorganizational relationships - substitutes and complements," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 833-847.
    38. Sergio G. Lazzarini & Gary J. Miller & Todd R. Zenger, 2008. "Dealing with the Paradox of Embeddedness: The Role of Contracts and Trust in Facilitating Movement Out of Committed Relationships," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(5), pages 709-728, October.
    39. Nicholas S. Argyres & Janet Bercovitz & Kyle J. Mayer, 2007. "Complementarity and Evolution of Contractual Provisions: An Empirical Study of IT Services Contracts," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(1), pages 3-19, February.
    40. Kidwell, Roland E. & Nygaard, Arne & Silkoset, Ragnhild, 2007. "Antecedents and effects of free riding in the franchisor-franchisee relationship," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 522-544, July.
    41. Avery W. Katz, 2008. "Contractual Enforcement Institutions and the Structure of Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 134-154, March.
    42. Saussier, Stephane, 2000. "Transaction costs and contractual incompleteness: the case of Electricite de France," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 189-206, June.
    43. Edward J. Zajac & Cyrus P. Olsen, 1993. "From Transaction Cost To Transactional Value Analysis: Implications For The Study Of Interorganizational Strategies," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 131-145, January.
    44. Evelien Croonen, 2010. "Trust and Fairness During Strategic Change Processes in Franchise Systems," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 191-209, August.
    45. Goldberg, Victor P & Erickson, John R, 1987. "Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 369-398, October.
    46. Josef Windsperger, 2003. "Complementarities and Substitutabilities in Franchise Contracting: Some Results from the German Franchise Sector," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(3), pages 291-313, September.
    47. Nada Mumdziev & Josef Windsperger, 2013. "An Extended Transaction Cost Model of Decision Rights Allocation in Franchising: The Moderating Role of Trust," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(3-5), pages 170-182, April.
    48. Baker, George P. & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J., 2008. "Strategic alliances: Bridges between "islands of conscious power"," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 146-163, June.
    49. Anjana Susarla & Ramanath Subramanyam & Prasanna Karhade, 2010. "Contractual Provisions to Mitigate Holdup: Evidence from Information Technology Outsourcing," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 37-55, March.
    50. John Hagedoorn & Geerte Hesen, 2009. "Contractual Complexity and the Cognitive Load of R&D Alliance Contracts," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(4), pages 818-847, December.
    51. Lyons, Bruce R, 1996. "Empirical Relevance of Efficient Contract Theory: Inter-firm Contracts," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 12(4), pages 27-52, Winter.
    52. Fabrice Lumineau & Bertrand Quélin, 2012. "An empirical investigation of interorganizational opportunism and contracting mechanisms," Post-Print hal-00668599, HAL.
    53. Williamson, Oliver E, 1993. "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 453-486, April.
    54. Hensher, David A., 2010. "Incompleteness and clarity in bus contracts: Identifying the nature of the ex ante and ex post perceptual divide," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 106-117.
    55. Erin Anderson & Barton Weitz, 1989. "Determinants of Continuity in Conventional Industrial Channel Dyads," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(4), pages 310-323.
    56. Oliver E. Williamson, 2014. "The Transaction Cost Economics Project," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 10(1), pages 7-12.
    57. Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-595, September.
    58. Davies, Mark A.P. & Lassar, Walfried & Manolis, Chris & Prince, Melvin & Winsor, Robert D., 2011. "A model of trust and compliance in franchise relationships," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 321-340, May.
    59. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
    60. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 2002. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 39-84.
    61. Rajiv Lal, 1990. "Improving Channel Coordination Through Franchising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 9(4), pages 299-318.
    62. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence," IEW - Working Papers 393, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    63. Gassenheimer, Jule B. & Baucus, David B. & Baucus, Melissa S., 1996. "Cooperative arrangements among entrepreneurs: An analysis of opportunism and communication in franchise structures," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 67-79, May.
    64. Patrick Hippmann & Josef Windsperger, 2013. "Formal and Real Authority in Interorganizational Networks: The Case of Joint Ventures," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(3-5), pages 319-327, April.
    65. Marco Furlotti, 2007. "There is more to contracts than incompleteness: a review and assessment of empirical research on inter-firm contract design," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 11(1), pages 61-99, March.
    66. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    67. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    68. Brickley, James A, 1999. "Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 745-774, October.
    69. Kosnik, Lea-Rachel, 2014. "Determinants of contract completeness: An environmental regulatory application," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 198-208.
    70. Jeffrey H Dyer & Wujin Chu, 2000. "The Determinants of Trust in Supplier-Automaker Relationships in the U.S., Japan and Korea," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 31(2), pages 259-285, June.
    71. Yuanyuan Chen & Anandhi Bharadwaj, 2009. "An Empirical Analysis of Contract Structures in IT Outsourcing," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 20(4), pages 484-506, December.
    72. John, George & Weitz, Barton A, 1988. "Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 337-355, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andrej Angelovski & Daniela Cagno & Daniela Grieco & Werner Güth, 2019. "Trusting versus monitoring: an experiment of endogenous institutional choices," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 329-355, December.
    2. Lesmeister, Simon & Limbach, Peter & Goergen, Marc, 2022. "Trust and monitoring," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    3. Fu-Sheng Tsai & Chin-Chiung Kuo & Julia L. Lin, 2020. "Knowledge Heterogenization of the Franchising Literature Applying Transaction Cost Economics," Economies, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-27, November.
    4. Vanesa Solís-Rodríguez & Manuel González-Díaz, 2019. "Prior interactions and contractual completeness in Spanish franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 795-812, October.
    5. Melih Madanoglu & Gary J. Castrogiovanni, 2018. "Franchising proportion and network failure," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 697-715, April.
    6. Begoña López-Fernández & Susana López-Bayón, 2018. "Antecedents of early terminations in franchising: franchisor versus franchisee cancelations," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 677-695, April.
    7. In Hyeock (Ian) Lee, 2022. "Startups, relocation, and firm performance: a transaction cost economics perspective," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 205-224, January.
    8. van der Valk, Wendy & Lumineau, Fabrice & Wang, Wenqian, 2019. "Research on contracting in supply chain management and related disciplines: A synthesis of scholarly recommendations and a discussion of future opportunities," Other publications TiSEM 55901a88-7fc5-4808-a47a-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Farhad Sadeh & Manish Kacker, 2018. "Quality signaling through ex-ante voluntary information disclosure in entrepreneurial networks: evidence from franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 729-748, April.
    10. Claude Ménard, 2018. "Organization and governance in the agrifood sector: How can we capture their variety?," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(1), pages 142-160, December.
    11. Akshay Bhat, 2019. "Bounded Rationality, Motivation & Private Information And Its Implications On Contracts," Working papers 2019-32-07, Voice of Research.
    12. Lina Mao & Chongluan Lu & Guangfan Sun & Chunyan Zhang & Changwei Guo, 2024. "Regional culture and corporate finance: a literature review," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-12, December.
    13. Roberta Troisi & Gaetano Alfano, 2023. "Proximity and inter-firm corruption: A transaction cost approach," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 1105-1120, March.
    14. Bo Liu & Yun-Fei Shao & Guowei Liu & Debing Ni, 2022. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Relational Governance in an Innovation Ecosystem," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(2), pages 21582440221, April.
    15. Perdreau, Frédéric & Fréchet, Marc, 2022. "Learning, contractual capabilities, and contract duration changes in franchise networks," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    16. Esther Calderon-Monge & Ivan Pastor-Sanz, 2017. "Effects of Contract and Trust on Franchisor Performance," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 11(4), December.
    17. Ilir Hajdini & Josef Windsperger, 2020. "Real options in franchise contracting: an application of transaction cost and real options theory," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 313-337, October.
    18. Gillis, William E. & Combs, James G. & Yin, Xiaoli, 2020. "Franchise management capabilities and franchisor performance under alternative franchise ownership strategies," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 35(1).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vanesa Solís-Rodríguez & Manuel González-Díaz, 2019. "Prior interactions and contractual completeness in Spanish franchising," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 795-812, October.
    2. Griessmair, Michele & Hussain, Dildar & Windsperger, Josef, 2014. "Trust and the tendency towards multi-unit franchising: A relational governance view," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(11), pages 2337-2345.
    3. Josef Windsperger, 2013. "The governance of franchising networks," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 27, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. López-Bayón, Susana & González-Díaz, Manuel, 2010. "Indefinite contract duration: Evidence from electronics subcontracting," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 145-159, June.
    5. Vanesa Solís-Rodríguez & Manuel González-Díaz, 2017. "Differences in contract design between successful and less successful franchises," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 483-502, December.
    6. Maloney, Michael T., 2017. "Alchian remembrances," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 561-582.
    7. Marco Furlotti, 2007. "There is more to contracts than incompleteness: a review and assessment of empirical research on inter-firm contract design," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 11(1), pages 61-99, March.
    8. Reuer, Jeffrey & Devarakonda, S.V., 2015. "Mechanisms of hybrid governance : Administrative committees in non-equity alliances," Other publications TiSEM 063d9ccc-59c8-4e76-a77d-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1998. "Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision," NBER Working Papers 6544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Anjana Susarla, 2012. "Contractual Flexibility, Rent Seeking, and Renegotiation Design: An Empirical Analysis of Information Technology Outsourcing Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(7), pages 1388-1407, July.
    11. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
    12. Anjana Susarla & Ramanath Subramanyam & Prasanna Karhade, 2010. "Contractual Provisions to Mitigate Holdup: Evidence from Information Technology Outsourcing," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 37-55, March.
    13. Fang, F., 2019. "When performance shortfall arises, contract or trust? A multi-method study of the impact of contractual and relational governances on performance in public – private partnerships," Other publications TiSEM 473840ee-6945-4a93-9326-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Desmond (Ho‐Fu) Lo & Giorgio Zanarone & Mrinal Ghosh, 2022. "Contracting to (dis)incentivize? An integrative transaction‐cost approach on how contracts govern specific investments," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(8), pages 1528-1555, August.
    15. Dildar Hussain & Josef Windsperger, 2013. "A property rights view of multi-unit franchising," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 169-185, April.
    16. Bernard Baudry & Virgile Chassagnon, 2012. "The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure: what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hub," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(2), pages 285-303, May.
    17. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 629-685, September.
    18. Jean Beuve & Stéphane Saussier, 2012. "Interfirm cooperation in strategic relationships: the role of formal contract," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 21(4), pages 811-836, August.
    19. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba & Josef Windsperger, 2015. "Network Form and Performance. The Case of Multi-Unit Franchising," Working Papers 1502, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    20. Lumineau, Fabrice & Malhotra, Deepak, 2011. "Shadow of the contract: how contract structure shapes inter-firm dispute resolution," MPRA Paper 38359, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contractual incompleteness; Franchising; Transaction costs; Trust; D23; L24; L26;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:44:y:2015:i:4:p:867-888. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.