Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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