Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
We study infinitely repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and assume that each period consists of two stages: one in which the players simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. In the first part of the paper, we derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. In the second part, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.
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