Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors.
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Volume (Year): 147 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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