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Susanne Goldlücke

Personal Details

First Name:Susanne
Middle Name:
Last Name:Goldlücke
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pgo439
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/goldluecke/home/team/prof-dr-susanne-goldluecke/
Terminal Degree:2009 Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Fachbereich; Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Universität Konstanz

Konstanz, Germany
http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/

: +49 7531 88 2314
+49-7531-88-2145
D-78457 Konstanz
RePEc:edi:fwkonde (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Engert, Andreas & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2013. "Why agents need discretion: The business judgment rule as optimal standard of care," Working Papers 13-04, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  2. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Goldluecke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2010. "In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 332, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  4. Kranz, Sebastian & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 259, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  5. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 231, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

Articles

  1. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
  2. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Renegotiation-proof relational contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 157-178.
  3. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 405-407.
  4. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
  5. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1191-1221.
  6. Susanne Ohlendorf, 2009. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1608-1618, September.
  7. Sebastian Kranz & Susanne Ohlendorf, 2009. "Social Planning with Partial Knowledge of Social Interactions. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(1), pages 159-163, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Engert, Andreas & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2013. "Why agents need discretion: The business judgment rule as optimal standard of care," Working Papers 13-04, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.

    Mentioned in:

    1. Should managers be liable in court?
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2013-03-14 20:30:00

Working papers

  1. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Filippin, Antonio & Crosetto, Paolo, 2014. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," IZA Discussion Papers 8184, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    3. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 116-120.
    4. Weinschenk, Philipp, 2017. "Working conditions and regulation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 177-191.
    5. Siegert, Caspar & Trepper, Piers, 2015. "Optimal tolerance for failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 41-55.
    6. Matthias Kräkel, 2017. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(2), pages 295-311, April.
    7. Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Wang, Cheng, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5248, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    9. At, Christian & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2015. "Moral hazard and agency relationship in sequential litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 86-90.
    10. Luigi Balletta & Giovanni Immordino, 2013. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with a Present Biased Agent," CSEF Working Papers 341, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    11. Matthias Kräkel, 2013. "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse03_2013, University of Bonn, Germany.
    12. Demougin, Dominique & Helm, Carsten, 2011. "Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 964-979.
    13. Matthias Fahn & Anne Schade & Katharina Schüßler, 2017. "What Drives Reciprocal Behavior? The Optimal Provision of Incentives over the Course of Careers," CESifo Working Paper Series 6635, CESifo Group Munich.
    14. Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Marco Buso & Anne Stenger, 2016. "Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: the dark side of public financing," Working Papers of BETA 2016-12, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    15. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 410, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    16. Esteve González, Patrícia, 2014. "Moral Hazard in Repeated Procurement of Services," Working Papers 2072/237593, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    17. Lorens Imhof & Matthias Kräkel, 2016. "Ex post unbalanced tournaments," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(1), pages 73-98, February.
    18. Mahmoud Sami Nabi, 2016. "Revisiting equity and debt: access to finance and economic inefficiency," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(4), pages 393-429, December.
    19. Kräkel, Matthias, 2016. "Peer effects and incentives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 120-127.
    20. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Friebel, Guido & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2016. "The firm as the locus of social comparisons: Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 41-59.
    21. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2012. "Internal labor markets and worker rents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 491-509.
    22. Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2015. "Rater Bias and Incentive Provision," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 833-862, October.
    23. Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2012. "How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships," IDEI Working Papers 724, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    24. Graham, Brad & Robles, Jack, 2016. "Attorney fees in repeated relationships," Working Paper Series 5074, Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance.
    25. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," MPRA Paper 36914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    26. Matthias Kräkel, 2014. "Peer Effects and Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse03_2014, University of Bonn, Germany.
    27. Pi, Jiancai, 2014. "Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 274-277.
    28. Axelson, Ulf & Bond, Philip, 2015. "Wall Street occupations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37448, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    29. Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Self-organizing teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 195-197.
    30. Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2011. "Investment banking careers: An equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs," FMG Discussion Papers dp690, Financial Markets Group.
    31. Matthias Kräkel & Daniel Müller, 2014. "Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse02_2014, University of Bonn, Germany.
    32. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2016. "Optimal sales force compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 179-195.
    33. Christian Lukas, 2017. "Contract design in dynamic agency: An experimental analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 38(8), pages 1216-1226, December.
    34. Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel, 2013. "Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79914, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  2. Goldluecke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2010. "In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 332, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Renegotiation-proof relational contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 157-178.
    2. Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2015. "Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 21457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
    5. Richter, Michael, 2014. "Fully absorbing dynamic compromise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 92-104.
    6. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.
    7. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 405-407.
    8. Samuelson, Larry & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2017. "Even up: Maintaining relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 170-217.

  3. Kranz, Sebastian & Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 259, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1191-1221.
    2. Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2010. "Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 725, Stockholm School of Economics.
    3. Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000423, David K. Levine.
    5. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Introductory Chapters,in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.

  4. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Gea M. Lee & Seung Han Yoo, 2013. "Unobserved Investment, Signaling, and Welfare," Discussion Paper Series 1301, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, revised 2017.
    2. Su, Alice Peng-Ju, 2017. "Information revelation in the Property Right Theory of the firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 133-164.
    3. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "The management of innovation: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 706-725.
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 642-645.
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Muller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2014. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 10207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 96-99.
    9. Rao, Neel, 2015. "General training in labor markets: Common value auctions with unobservable investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 19-45.
    10. Gick, Wolfgang, 2015. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113069, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 10110, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  5. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    2. Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Wang, Cheng, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5248, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2009. "Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 264, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    5. Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2012. "How to Design Infrastructure Contracts in a Warming World? A Critical Appraisal of Public-Private Partnerships," IDEI Working Papers 724, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    6. Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, 2009. "Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse8_2009, University of Bonn, Germany.
    7. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2011. "How to Design Public-Private Partnerships in a Warming World? - When Infrastructure Becomes a Really “Hot” Topic," Working Papers 2011/25, Maastricht School of Management.
    8. Stefanie Aniela Lehmann, 2008. "When Randomization in Collective Tournaments is Profitable for the Principal," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse19_2008, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 2009.

  6. Ohlendorf, Susanne, 2008. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 231, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 9141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Daniel Göller, 2014. "Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 473-498.
    3. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.
    4. Bragelien, Iver & Impink, Joost, 2014. "Relationship-Specificity, Bargaining Power Growth, and Firm Performance," Discussion Papers 2014/4, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," MPRA Paper 44953, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
    8. Goller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments," Working Papers 72, Yale University, Department of Economics.
    9. Schweizer, Urs, 2016. "Efficient incentives from obligation law and the compensation principle," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 54-62.
    10. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

Articles

  1. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.

    Cited by:

    1. Gea M. Lee & Seung Han Yoo, 2013. "Unobserved Investment, Signaling, and Welfare," Discussion Paper Series 1301, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, revised 2017.
    2. Su, Alice Peng-Ju, 2017. "Information revelation in the Property Right Theory of the firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 133-164.
    3. Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "The management of innovation: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 706-725.
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 642-645.
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Muller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2014. "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 10207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 96-99.
    9. Rao, Neel, 2015. "General training in labor markets: Common value auctions with unobservable investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 19-45.
    10. Gick, Wolfgang, 2015. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113069, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    11. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2014. "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered," CEPR Discussion Papers 10110, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  2. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Renegotiation-proof relational contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 157-178.

    Cited by:

    1. James M. Malcomson, 2016. "Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 317-346, January.
    2. Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2010. "Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 725, Stockholm School of Economics.
    3. Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80047, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.

  3. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2012. "Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1191-1221.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Susanne Ohlendorf, 2009. "Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1608-1618, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2008-04-15 2011-02-26 2013-03-02
  2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (3) 2008-04-12 2009-11-07 2011-02-26
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2008-04-12 2009-05-16 2010-08-28
  4. NEP-PPM: Project, Program & Portfolio Management (2) 2008-04-12 2011-02-26
  5. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (1) 2013-03-02
  6. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2008-04-15

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