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More about this item
KeywordsVolunteering; public good provision; mechanism design;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-MIC-2019-02-04 (Microeconomics)
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