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Crowdfunding public goods: An experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Erik Ansink

    (Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands)

  • Mark Koetse

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands)

  • Jetske Bouma

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands)

  • Dominic Hauck

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands)

  • Daan van Soest

    (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

Abstract

We assess the impact of different crowdfunding designs on the success of crowdfunded public goods using a lab-in-the-field experiment. Our design treatments aim to increase the efficiency of crowdfunding campaigns by raising aggregate contributions and decreasing possible coordination problems that may occur when potential donors are faced with a multitude of projects seeking contributions. Amongst others, we explore the potential of seed money and the impact of the attraction effect. Using a four-day time window we implement our crowdfunding experiment using a web-based user interface with multiple threshold public goods, similar in style to conventional crowdfunding websites. We find that such alternative crowdfunding designs affect efficiency via improving coordination, and not so much via affecting total contributions. These results are confirmed in a follow-up framed field experiment with actual nature conservation projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Ansink & Mark Koetse & Jetske Bouma & Dominic Hauck & Daan van Soest, 2017. "Crowdfunding public goods: An experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-119/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170119
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cason, Timothy N. & Tabarrok, Alex & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2021. "Early refund bonuses increase successful crowdfunding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 78-95.
    2. Abraham, Diya & Corazzini, Luca & Fišar, Miloš & Reggiani, Tommaso, 2023. "Coordinating donations via an intermediary: The destructive effect of a sunk overhead cost," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 287-304.
    3. Chan, Nathan W. & Wolk, Leonard, 2020. "Cost-effective giving with multiple public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 130-145.
    4. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2019. "Disincentive Effects of Evaluation," Working Paper 1410, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    5. Cason, Timothy N. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2019. "Donation-based crowdfunding with refund bonuses," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 452-471.
    6. Luca Corazzini & Christopher Cotton & Tommaso Reggiani, 2020. "Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1030-1068, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crowdfunding; lab-in-the-field experiment; threshold public goods; charitable giving; nature conservation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics

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