Delegation and Coordination with Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
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- Luca Corazzini & Christopher Cotton & Tommaso Reggiani, 2019. "Delegation And Coordination With Multiple Threshold Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," MUNI ECON Working Papers 2019-02, Masaryk University.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ondřej Krčál & Rostislav Staněk & Bára Karlínová & Stefanie Peer, 2019. "Real consequences matters: why hypothetical biases in the valuation of time persist even in controlled lab experiments," MUNI ECON Working Papers 2019-03, Masaryk University.
More about this item
Keywordsdelegation; threshold public goods; laboratory experiment; fundraising;
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-EXP-2019-03-11 (Experimental Economics)
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