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Charitable giving and intermediation

Listed author(s):
  • Nadine Chlaß

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Turku, Finland and University of Jena, Germany)

  • Lata Gangadharan

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia)

  • Kristy Jones

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia)

Charitable donations are often made through intermediaries who can fund themselves from these same donations. Donors who purchase charitable output through an intermediary incur a principal-agent problem with unobservable prices. We compare charitable giving in an experiment with and without intermediation. Different donor types emerge: 41 per-cent of all donors reduce their donation in response to intermediation, 59 per-cent of all donors give as much or more with than without intermediation. The price of charitable output does not explain these types and appears to only matter after taking characteristics of donors' moral judgement into account.

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File URL: http://pubdb.wiwi.uni-jena.de/pdf/wp_2015_021.pdf
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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2015-021.

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Date of creation: 19 Nov 2015
Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2015-021
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